Thursday, June 20, 2024

New Age of Terror: Al-Shabaab's Potential Drone Warfare

In a world where drones have revolutionized modern warfare, the thought of such technology falling into the hands of terrorist organizations is deeply unsettling. Recently, US intelligence has uncovered discussions between the Houthis in Yemen and Al-Shabaab in Somalia regarding the supply of advanced drones. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, over 80% of Houthi drone strikes in Yemen have targeted critical infrastructure, causing significant casualties and damage. This statistic underscores the destructive potential of drone technology and raises alarming questions about what could happen if Al-Shabaab acquires similar capabilities.

Increased Threat to Civilians and Infrastructure
Drones could also be used to target critical infrastructure and civilian areas, causing widespread fear and disruption. The psychological impact of drone strikes creates an environment of constant fear and insecurity, likely leading to increased displacement of civilians and exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation in Somalia. The Houthis have demonstrated their capability and willingness to use drones in Yemen, launching numerous attacks on both military and civilian targets, causing significant damage and casualties. This precedent raises concerns about the extent of damage Al-Shabaab could inflict if they acquire similar technology.


Regional Instability

The ripple effects of this development would not be confined to Somalia. Neighboring countries, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia, would be on high alert for potential drone incursions. The fear of cross-border attacks could heighten regional tensions and lead to an arms race as countries seek to bolster their defenses against aerial threats. Additionally, the presence of drones could complicate international efforts to provide aid and support to affected regions, as aid organizations might face increased risks.


Iranian Involvement: A Geopolitical Concern

Iran's role in supporting the Houthis is well-documented. The United Nations and various international observers have reported on Iran's provision of weapons, training, and financial aid to the Houthis, which has been a critical factor in sustaining their prolonged conflict in Yemen. The possibility of Iranian involvement in supplying drones to Al-Shabaab introduces a new dimension to the conflict. This move could be seen as part of Iran's broader strategy to exert influence in the region and destabilize its rivals. The international community, particularly the United States and its allies, would likely respond with increased sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Iran to curtail its support for terrorist groups.


Comparison to Houthis in Yemen

The Houthis in Yemen have successfully used drones to strengthen their military operations and control significant parts of the country, including the capital, Sanaa. According to a 2023 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Houthis have conducted over 400 drone strikes since 2018, significantly impacting the conflict in Yemen (CSIS, 2023). Drawing a parallel, if Al-Shabaab uses drones similarly, they might achieve a comparable level of control in Somalia. This scenario becomes even more plausible considering Al-Shabaab's historical adaptability and tactical ingenuity. However, the extent of their success would largely depend on the local and international responses to their advancements.


Debate on Al-Shabaab's Potential Control of Central and Southern Somalia

The discussions between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab have sparked a debate on whether Al-Shabaab could capture central and southern Somalia, similar to the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan. This concern is fueled by the increased capabilities that drones would provide to Al-Shabaab, potentially enabling them to exert greater control over these regions. According to VOA News, Al-Shabaab has reversed all Somali National Army gains made in central Somalia over the last two years (

VOA News, 2024).

Drawing parallels with the Taliban's swift and decisive capture of Afghanistan, analysts worry that Al-Shabaab might employ a similar strategy. The Taliban's success was largely due to their ability to exploit the weaknesses of the Afghan government and capitalize on the withdrawal of foreign troops. Similarly, Al-Shabaab could use drones to exploit vulnerabilities within the Somali government and military forces, paving the way for a rapid and aggressive expansion of their control over central and southern Somalia.


Conclusion

The potential for Al-Shabaab to acquire drones from the Houthis represents a significant escalation in the conflict dynamics within Somalia and the broader region. Addressing this threat requires a coordinated and comprehensive approach that balances military, diplomatic, and humanitarian strategies to ensure lasting peace and stability. The international community must act swiftly and decisively to prevent the proliferation of drone technology to terrorist groups and to support efforts aimed at achieving long-term security in the region.


Author: Said Noor


Sources:

1-Babb, Carla. "Al-Shabab reverses Somali force gains, now working with Houthis in Somalia." VOA News. Accessed June 20, 2024.        

https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-reverses-somali-force-gains-is-working-with-houthis-in-somalia-/7659656.html

.

2-Robinson, Kali. "Iran’s Support of the Houthis: What to Know." Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed June 20, 2024.

https://www.cfr.org/article/irans-support-houthis-what-know

.

3-"U.S. Wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen: What Are The Endstates?" CSIS. Accessed June 20, 2024.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-wars-iraq-syria-libya-and-yemen-what-are-endstates

.

4-"The UN Exposes Houthi Reliance on Iranian Weapons." The Washington Institute. Accessed June 20, 2024.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/un-exposes-houthi-reliance-iranian-weapons

.



 

Tuesday, June 18, 2024

Will Al-Shabaab Negotiate with the Federal Government?

In his 2024 Oslo Forum speech, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia highlighted the government's struggle with international terrorism and recent military successes. He underscored the commitment to peaceful means, including political engagements and amnesty for those renouncing extremism. During a debate in Oslo, he reiterated his readiness for dialogue with al-Shabaab, emphasizing that "peace cannot be achieved by force; it can only be achieved by understanding." His stance reflects a commitment to exploring alternatives beyond military strategies to address the security challenges posed by al-Shabaab.

After two years of fighting al-Shabaab, it seems President Mohamud is back to square one, confronting the same formidable challenges that have plagued his administration and the country.

Criticisms of Negotiation

The idea of negotiating with al-Shabaab has sparked significant debate and criticism. Key criticisms include:

  1. Legitimizing Terrorism: Critics argue that negotiating with al-Shabaab could inadvertently legitimize the group's violent tactics and extremist ideology. Engaging in dialogue may be seen as recognizing al-Shabaab as a legitimate political entity, undermining international efforts to combat terrorism. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted, "The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose," reflecting the asymmetrical nature of such conflicts.
  2. Undermining Security Efforts: Opponents believe that negotiations could weaken the resolve of Somali and international security forces fighting al-Shabaab. There is concern that talks might lead to a reduction in military pressure on the group, allowing them to regroup and strengthen their operations. Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's quote, "An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last," underscores the fear that negotiating with extremists can embolden them, leading to greater instability.
  3. Risk of Incomplete Peace: Negotiations with extremist groups often risk achieving only partial or temporary peace. Al-Shabaab's deeply entrenched ideology and transnational jihadist connections make it unlikely they will fully renounce violence and integrate into a peaceful political process. This could lead to peace agreements being violated, resulting in renewed violence.
  4. Moral Hazard: Engaging in negotiations with al-Shabaab might set a dangerous precedent, suggesting that violent insurgency is an effective strategy to gain political concessions. This could inspire other extremist groups in the region to adopt similar tactics, leading to increased instability. Former U.S. President John F. Kennedy stated, "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate," highlighting the delicate balance between negotiating and maintaining a strong stance against terrorism.
  5. Non-Recognition of the Constitution: Al-Shabaab does not recognize the country's constitution, which is the law of the land. This fundamental rejection of Somalia’s legal and political framework poses a significant barrier to meaningful negotiation. It is unlikely that al-Shabaab would agree to terms aligning with constitutional and democratic principles upheld by the Federal Government, undermining the rule of law and efforts to establish a stable society.


Comparing Al-Shabaab and the Taliban

Understanding the unique challenges of negotiating with al-Shabaab involves comparing them with the Taliban:

  • Origins and Goals: The Taliban originated in Afghanistan with the goal of establishing an Islamic Emirate under their strict interpretation of Sharia law. Al-Shabaab also aims to establish an Islamic state in Somalia but has a more transnational agenda, with strong ties to al-Qaeda and ambitions extending beyond Somali borders.
  • Territorial Control: The Taliban have historically controlled significant territories in Afghanistan, establishing quasi-governmental administrative structures. Al-Shabaab, although controlling some regions in Somalia, operates more as an insurgent group with less stable territorial control.
  • International Reach: Al-Shabaab has a broader transnational jihadist agenda compared to the Taliban. Their operations have included attacks in neighboring countries like Kenya, indicating a wider operational scope and more global jihadist outlook.
  • Severity and Tactics: Both groups are notorious for their brutal tactics, but al-Shabaab has been particularly ruthless in targeting civilians. Their attacks on public spaces, schools, and markets demonstrate a level of brutality that often exceeds that of the Taliban. Incidents like the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, the 2015 Garissa University attack in Kenya, and the 2017 Soobe 1 incident in Mogadishu underscore al-Shabaab's willingness to inflict mass casualties on civilians.


Will Al-Shabaab Negotiate?

While President Mohamud has expressed willingness for dialogue, al-Shabaab's response remains uncertain. Their main goals and ideology include:

  • Overthrowing the Central Government: Al-Shabaab seeks to destabilize the Somali Federal Government and replace it with its own rule.
  • Expelling Foreign Forces: The group aims to remove foreign military forces from Somalia.
  • Establishing an Islamic State: Al-Shabaab’s ultimate goal is to create an Islamic state governed by its interpretation of Sharia law.
  • Transnational Jihadist Agenda: With ties to al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab aims to extend its influence beyond Somalia and support global jihadist movements.

Given these goals, it is unclear whether al-Shabaab would genuinely engage in a negotiation process that might require them to abandon their core objectives. Historically, the group has shown little inclination to compromise or seek peaceful solutions, making them a particularly challenging entity for peaceful negotiations.


Conclusion

President Mohamud’s initiative for dialogue reflects a commendable commitment to peace but is fraught with complexities and risks. The international community and Somali citizens remain divided on the merits and potential outcomes of such negotiations. The critical question is whether al-Shabaab will negotiate in good faith or exploit the talks to further its agenda. Lasting peace in Somalia likely requires a multifaceted approach, including dialogue and decisive security measures. As Theodore Roosevelt said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far," highlighting the need for balance in peace efforts.


Sources:

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, keynote speech at the 2024 Oslo Forum.

"Somalia: Deadly Bombing Strikes Mogadishu," The New York Times, October 15, 2017. Available at: The New York Times

"Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya," START Background Report, April 2015. Available at: START


Author: Said Noor

 


Friday, June 14, 2024

Chaos and Controversy: The Battle Over Mogadishu's Cemetery

Oh, the Bulusiya School cemetery in Mogadishu! It's a place where even the dead aren't safe from the government's land grab. Who needs peace and quiet when you can have a shiny new Somali Navy training center, right?

But seriously, it's a pretty somber situation. Families are being forced to spend money to exhume and reinter their loved ones due to the government's decision to repurpose the cemetery land. It's causing a lot of emotional distress and public outcry.

The Somali government has given families a tight deadline to relocate the bodies from the Bulusiya School cemetery. The Defense Minister claims the land is crucial for national interests, but many people are accusing the government of insensitivity and a lack of transparency.

It's a tough situation, and it's understandable why people are upset. I mean, who wants to dig up their loved ones and move them to a new location? It's a lot to ask, especially when it's done without much warning or consideration for the families' feelings.

But hey, at least the Somali Navy will have a nice new training center, right?

In the heart of Mogadishu lies the Bulusiya School cemetery. Located centrally in the Hodan district, near the bustling Bakara Market, this graveyard has silently borne witness to the city's tumultuous past. Established in the late 19th century during the colonial era, it has since become the final resting place for an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 souls. Among those buried here are former leaders, artists, scholars, and poets, including notable figures such as General Salaad Gabayre Kadiye, General Aynanshe, singer Mohamed Suleban Tubec, Abdi Tahlil Warsame, Marshale, and Awkuku. The government's recent directive to exhume bodies from this cemetery, citing concerns over disease transmission and the need for more space in the densely populated city, has ignited significant controversy. Many locals view this decision as a profound disrespect to their ancestors, seeing the graveyard not just as a burial ground but as a crucial part of their cultural and historical heritage. The graveyard's location and history make it a landmark of immense emotional and historical significance, and the debate over its future highlights the delicate balance between development and reverence for the past.

Suitability for Naval Training

But is the graveyard suitable for naval training camp? While it may seem like a strategic location, the reality is far more concerning. The graveyard is situated in the center of the city, surrounded by residents, and its tiny size raises significant questions about its suitability for naval training. The health impacts of living near a graveyard cannot be ignored. Studies have shown that proximity to graveyards can increase the risk of respiratory diseases, mental health issues, and even cancer. Decomposing bodies can lead to the spread of serious diseases like tuberculosis, cholera, dysentery, typhoid, and other waterborne illnesses. Furthermore, the leaching of decomposing material into groundwater can contaminate the water supply, posing long-term health risks to both naval personnel and the local population. The psychological impact of living near a graveyard is equally troubling, contributing to anxiety and stress among residents. Considering these factors, the suitability of a graveyard for naval training is highly questionable due to the potential health risks for personnel. It is crucial to prioritize the well-being of our naval trainees by seeking alternative sites that do not pose such severe health and environmental hazards.

Alternative Strategic Locations

While the Bulusiya School cemetery is central, other strategic locations should be considered for naval training. If the president is sincere in addressing this matter, Somalia's extensive coastline, the longest in Africa, presents several viable alternatives. Given that much of the southern and central coast of Somalia is controlled by Al-Shabaab, Puntland emerges as the best option, offering a considerable coastline suitable for naval training facilities. Important factors such as accessibility, security, and existing infrastructure should be prioritized when selecting the location. The graveyard in Mogadishu is not merely a burial site but a repository of rich history and cultural heritage. The government's decision to disinter the dead may stem from practical motives, yet it is crucial to recognize the cultural and emotional significance of the cemetery to the local community. Alternative strategic locations for naval training comp should be explored to avoid harming or disrespecting the community. As Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Noor pointed out, the country’s naval coast guard will be stationed there. This situation requires carefully balancing progress with respect for historical and cultural heritage; however, the current approach appears to be leaning toward chaos and controversy.

Author: Said Noor




 

Tuesday, June 11, 2024

Ending the Petro-Dollar Era: A Paradigm Shift in Global Finance

On June 9, 2024, Saudi Arabia marked a historic shift in the global financial landscape by ending its 50-year agreement with the United States to sell oil exclusively in U.S. dollars. This monumental decision allows Saudi Arabia to trade oil and other goods in multiple currencies, signaling the end of the petrodollar era and setting the stage for significant implications in global finance and the U.S. dollar's role in international trade.

Key Points:

Historical Context: The original deal, signed in 1974, was a cornerstone of U.S.-Saudi relations, linking oil sales to the U.S. dollar and fostering economic and military cooperation between the two nations. This agreement was instrumental in establishing the U.S. dollar as the dominant global reserve currency, reinforcing America's economic influence worldwide.

New Trading Flexibility: With the expiration of the agreement, Saudi Arabia can now trade oil in multiple currencies, including the Chinese RMB, Euros, Yen, and Yuan. There's also potential for utilizing digital currencies like Bitcoin. This newfound flexibility is expected to accelerate the global shift away from the U.S. dollar as the primary reserve currency, challenging its dominance in international trade and finance.

Project mBridge: In addition to diversifying its currency options, Saudi Arabia is actively participating in Project mBridge. This initiative, started in 2021, is a collaborative effort between the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Innovation Hub, the Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, the Digital Currency Institute of the People’s Bank of China, and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The project's goal is to create a multi-central bank digital currency (CBDC) platform aimed at enabling instant cross-border payment settlements using distributed ledger technology (DLT). This project represents a forward-thinking approach to financial transactions, promoting efficiency and reducing reliance on traditional banking systems.

Why It Matters:

The end of the petrodollar agreement has far-reaching implications:

  • Global Economic Shift: This move is a clear signal of the shifting power dynamics in global finance. With Saudi Arabia leading the way, other oil-producing nations might follow suit, reducing their reliance on the U.S. dollar and diversifying their trading currencies.
  • Impact on the U.S. Dollar: As the world's largest oil exporter begins to accept multiple currencies, the demand for U.S. dollars may decrease, potentially weakening the dollar's value and influence in global markets.
  • Rise of Digital Currencies: The potential inclusion of digital currencies like Bitcoin in oil trading could legitimize and accelerate the adoption of cryptocurrencies, leading to significant changes in how global transactions are conducted.

Key Observers of Project mBridge:

The mBridge project has garnered attention and participation from several major financial institutions and central banks, including:

  • South African Reserve Bank
  • Bank of Israel
  • Bank of Namibia
  • Bank of France
  • Central Bank of Bahrain
  • Central Bank of Egypt
  • Central Bank of Jordan
  • European Central Bank
  • International Monetary Fund (IMF)
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York
  • Reserve Bank of Australia
  • World Bank

Conclusion:

This evolution signifies a significant step towards a decentralized global financial system. By adopting a multi-currency approach and leveraging digital currencies, Saudi Arabia is not only reducing its dependence on the U.S. dollar but also paving the way for other nations to explore similar financial strategies. This move could lead to a more balanced and diversified global economic environment, where no single currency holds disproportionate influence.

Flashback:

Reflecting on the past, the 1974 agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was a strategic maneuver that solidified the U.S. dollar's dominance in global trade. For five decades, this relationship shaped international finance and geopolitical strategies. Now, as Saudi Arabia moves away from this exclusive arrangement, we witness the beginning of a new era in global economics. The decisions made today will likely be studied by future generations as a pivotal moment when the world began to transition towards a more decentralized and multi-faceted financial system.

Call to Action :

What are your thoughts on Saudi Arabia's decision and its impact on global finance? Share your opinions in the comments below!

Author: Said Noor






Monday, June 10, 2024

Urgent Appeal from Puntland State to International Partners

In a critical and heartfelt appeal, H.E. Said Abdullahi Deni, President of Puntland State of Somalia, has addressed an urgent letter to numerous international entities, including countries, unions, and financial institutions. The letter, dated June 9, 2024, highlights growing concerns over Mogadishu's increasing politicization of donor assistance and grant budgetary support, urging a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian, development, and budgetary support.

Politicization of Aid

President Deni expresses deep concern over Mogadishu’s handling of donor assistance, which he claims is being used for politically motivated agendas. This trend, according to Deni, undermines the core purpose of development aid, which is to improve the lives of citizens and foster sustainable progress, rather than advancing narrow political interests.

He points out that since his re-election, there has been a troubling pattern of politicization affecting Puntland State’s earmarked projects, programs, and budgetary support for the past 18 months. Despite bringing this issue to the attention of multilateral development banks and the donor community multiple times, the situation persists. This misuse of aid resources, Deni argues, is detrimental to the effective governance and fiscal responsibility that Puntland is committed to upholding.

Efforts and Challenges

The letter details the Puntland government’s significant efforts to engage constructively with multilateral development banks, donors, and Mogadishu to resolve outstanding technical issues. Unfortunately, these efforts have been met with limited success. Mogadishu has initiated a campaign of disinformation and misinformation, portraying Puntland as inflexible and unwilling to collaborate. The reality, Deni asserts, is that Mogadishu’s true goal appears to be the destabilization of Puntland State.

Call for Inclusive Process

President Deni emphasizes the importance of an inclusive process involving foreign aid, trade, treaties, natural resources, and other major issues affecting the interests of the Federal Member States (FMS), including Puntland, as stipulated in Article 53 of the federal constitution (2012). He highlights Somalia’s political instability, weak institutions, security challenges, and lack of national agreement on key issues as significant obstacles to effective governance.

Appeal for Direct Aid

Given the critical situation, President Deni appeals to bilateral and multilateral partners to recognize the gravity of the situation and support Puntland in receiving necessary donor assistance and grant budgetary support, free from Mogadishu’s politicization. He proposes establishing an alternative mechanism enabling multilateral development banks to provide direct aid and support to Puntland.

Vision for a United Somalia

Deni concludes by reaffirming Puntland’s commitment to being a reliable and responsible partner in Somalia, dedicated to inclusivity, fairness, and equitable development. He calls on international partners to support efforts to build a more prosperous Puntland State and Somalia. He urges them to use their influence to safeguard democracy, uphold the rule of law, and promote peace throughout Somalia.

Conclusion

This urgent appeal from President Deni underscores the complex and challenging political landscape in Somalia. It highlights the need for transparent and fair distribution of international aid, free from political manipulation, to foster genuine development and stability in the region. The international community's support is crucial in addressing these pressing issues and ensuring a brighter future for Puntland and Somalia as a whole.





 

Expelling Ethiopia: The Factors Behind Somalia's Bold Move and the Challenges It Faces

In a significant and bold move, Somalia's cabinet has decided to expel Ethiopian forces by the end of the year. This decision, driven by a mix of sovereignty disputes, internal political pressures, and security considerations, presents a complex set of challenges. Let’s delve into the key factors behind this decision and the hurdles Somalia faces.


📌 Key Factors Driving the Decision:

Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal:

  • Strategic Agreement: Ethiopia and Somaliland recently signed a deal granting Ethiopia land for a naval base in Somaliland in exchange for recognizing Somaliland's independence.
  • Sovereignty Violation: The Somali Federal Government (SFG) does not recognize Somaliland's independence and views the port deal as a violation of its sovereignty, as it was not consulted about the agreement.

Internal Somali Politics:

  • Accusations of Meddling: Somali National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh Ali has accused Ethiopia of interfering in Somalia's internal affairs, including its engagement with the autonomous Puntland region, which has had strained relations with the SFG.
  • Political Pressures: The decision is heavily influenced by domestic political pressures and a desire to assert authority over all Somali territories, including breakaway regions and autonomous areas.

Security and Military Considerations:

  • Troop Presence: Ethiopia maintains over 4,000 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), along with additional bilateral deployments. ATMIS is a peacekeeping mission aimed at stabilizing the country and combating al Shabaab.
  • Buffer Zone: These troops are crucial for creating a buffer zone against al Shabaab, a militant group that has launched significant attacks into Ethiopia from Somali territory.

🚨 Actions Taken and Challenges Presented by the Decision:

Expulsion of Ethiopian Ambassador:

  • Diplomatic Rift: The Somali cabinet has expelled the Ethiopian ambassador from the country, signaling a severe diplomatic rift.

Closure of Ethiopian Consulates:

  • Consulate Closures: The Somali cabinet ordered the closure of Ethiopian consulates in Garowe, Puntland, and Hargeisa, Somaliland.
  • Rejection by Regions: Both Puntland and Somaliland have rejected the decision to close the consulates, further complicating the situation and escalating tensions. This reflects the SFG's attempts to reduce Ethiopian influence in regions with significant autonomy.

Rejection by Regional States:

  • Opposition from Jubaland and Southwest: Jubaland and Southwest states have also rejected the SFG’s decision to expel Ethiopian troops. These states rely on Ethiopian forces for stability and security against al Shabaab.
  • Fragmented Federal System: Their rejection underscores the fragmented nature of Somalia's federal system and highlights the challenges the SFG faces in enforcing its decisions across the country.

Legitimacy and Sovereignty Issues:

  • Strengthening Sovereignty: The SFG aims to assert its sovereignty and strengthen its legitimacy, but the inability to enforce these decisions could backfire.
  • Risk of Backfire: Failure to expel Ethiopian forces may highlight the SFG’s weaknesses and increase anti-government sentiment.

Security Vacuum:

  • Potential Vacuums: Ethiopia's withdrawal could create a security vacuum that the Somali National Army (SNA) is ill-equipped to fill.
  • Al Shabaab Threat: This could lead to increased opportunities for al Shabaab to exploit, further destabilizing central and southern Somalia.

International and Regional Dynamics:

  • Broader Tensions: Somalia's decision comes amidst broader regional tensions and dynamics, including Ethiopia's internal conflicts and its regional ambitions.
  • Post-ATMIS Framework: The SFG has signaled that it may invite other ATMIS-contributing states to remain in a post-ATMIS framework, but this may not fully compensate for the loss of Ethiopian troops.

The SFG's decision to expel Ethiopian forces by the end of the year is a bold move driven by key factors and presenting significant challenges. The success of this decision will depend on the SFG's ability to navigate the complex web of internal and external factors at play. As Somalia strives to assert its sovereignty and manage its security concerns, the coming months will be critical in determining the impact of this significant diplomatic and military shift.