Lessons from Puntland: A Strategy for the Federal Government to Defeat Al-Shabaab

Author: Said Noor

Introduction

The continued presence of Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia remains one of the most pressing security concerns for the Somali federal government. Despite ongoing military operations, the militant group retains control over vast territories and frequently carries out attacks against government officials and civilians. The March 18, 2025, attack on President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy near Villa Somalia underscores the persistence of this threat.

In contrast, Puntland successfully eliminated Daesh (ISIS-Somalia) in the Cal Miskaat Mountains within two months in 2025, demonstrating a more effective counterterrorism strategy. This article examines Puntland’s approach and outlines how the Somali federal government can adapt this model to defeat Al-Shabaab through a comprehensive national defense plan.

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Background: The Al-Shabaab Threat and Federal Government’s Approach

Current Counterterrorism Efforts in Southern Somalia

The Somali National Army (SNA), supported by regional forces, clan militias, and international allies, has conducted several offensives against Al-Shabaab. President Mohamud’s administration has emphasized military action, particularly in central and southern regions. However, despite these efforts, Al-Shabaab remains resilient due to:

• Fragmented military strategy – Disconnected regional operations without a unified command.
• Limited coordination with local forces – Unlike Puntland’s effective use of community-led intelligence, federal forces struggle to integrate local militias.
• Tactical adaptability of Al-Shabaab – The group shifts between conventional and guerrilla tactics, allowing it to survive military pressure.

The Attack on President Mohamud: A Case Study in Security Challenges

According to Reuters, Al-Shabaab targeted President Mohamud’s convoy as it traveled towards Mogadishu’s airport. The attack, which killed at least four people, was later claimed by the group on its Telegram channel (Reuters, 2025).

Presidential adviser Zakariye Hussein later confirmed that the president was unharmed and continued to the front lines, reinforcing his commitment to counterterrorism efforts.

Strategic Implications of the Attack

1. Challenge to Government Authority – Directly targeting the president signals Al-Shabaab’s continued defiance.
2. Undermining Public Confidence – Frequent high-profile attacks discourage investment and weaken public trust in security measures (Marchal, 2011).
3. Exposure of Security Gaps – The ability to attack near a fortified location suggests potential intelligence failures or insider involvement.

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Puntland’s Counterterrorism Success Against Daesh in 2025

How Puntland Defeated Daesh in 60 Days

In early 2025, ISIS-affiliated militants attempted to establish a base in the Cal Miskaat Mountains of Puntland. However, within two months, Puntland forces successfully eliminated them using a well-coordinated and intelligence-driven strategy:

• A Unified Military Command – Puntland’s security forces acted under a centralized plan, ensuring operational efficiency.
• Rapid Deployment of Counterterrorism Units – Puntland launched swift and precise military actions instead of prolonged operations.
• Community Engagement and Intelligence Sharing – Puntland authorities encouraged local populations to report militant activity, effectively disrupting Daesh’s networks.

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How the Federal Government Can Apply Puntland’s Strategy

To effectively defeat Al-Shabaab, the federal government must shift from short-term offensives to a structured national defense plan. This requires:

1. Establishing a Unified National Defense Strategy

• Integrate federal, regional, and clan-based forces into a cohesive military structure.
• Develop a centralized command system to ensure effective coordination between units.

2. Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

• Invest in local intelligence networks, following Puntland’s model of community-based reporting.
• Strengthen counterterrorism coordination between national security agencies and international partners.

3. Deploying Permanent Security Forces in Reclaimed Areas

• Instead of temporary military operations, establish permanent security posts in areas freed from Al-Shabaab control.
• Provide local governance and social services to prevent Al-Shabaab from regaining influence.

4. Learning from Puntland’s Rapid Response Model

• Train elite rapid-response counterterrorism units capable of launching highly targeted operations against Al-Shabaab leaders.
• Improve logistical support and mobility to ensure troops can respond quickly to emerging threats.

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Conclusion

The federal government’s current strategy against Al-Shabaab has yielded limited success due to fragmentation, intelligence weaknesses, and lack of a unified national defense plan. Puntland’s successful elimination of Daesh in 2025 demonstrates that a coordinated, intelligence-led, and community-supported approach can effectively dismantle militant networks.

To replicate Puntland’s success, the Somali federal government must adopt a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that prioritizes unified command, intelligence gathering, and permanent security deployments. Only by learning from Puntland’s rapid and decisive operations can Somalia hope to eliminate Al-Shabaab and secure long-term stability.

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References

• Botha, A., & Abdile, M. (2019). Radicalization and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia. Institute for Security Studies.
• Brookings Institution. (2023). Somalia’s Counterterrorism Strategy Under President Mohamud.
• Bryden, M. (2022). Somalia’s Security Sector Reform: Challenges and Prospects. CSIS.
• Crisis Group. (2023). Somalia’s War Against Al-Shabaab: Challenges and Opportunities.
• Hansen, S. J. (2013). Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012. Oxford University Press.
• Hiraal Institute. (2024). Security Risks in Mogadishu: Al-Shabaab’s Evolving Tactics.
• International Crisis Group. (2024). Security Risks in Mogadishu: Al-Shabaab’s Evolving Tactics.
• Marchal, R. (2011). The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in Somalia. African Security Review, 20(2), 47-57.
• Reuters. (2025). Somali Militants Target Presidential Convoy in Bomb Attack, President Safe.
• Wikipedia. (2024). Puntland’s Counterterrorism Success Against ISIS-Somalia in Cal Miskaat Mountains.
• Williams, P. (2021). Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2021. Oxford University Press.

 

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Puntland's Fight Against Terror: How U.S. Airstrikes Shift the Balance

By Said Noor

Introduction: 

A Strategic Shift in Somalia’s Counterterrorism Battle

On February 1, 2025, former U.S. President Donald Trump ordered precision airstrikes targeting ISIS militants in Puntland, Somalia. The operation, focused on Al-Miskat hideouts in the Bari region, was conducted in coordination with Puntland’s government, significantly weakening ISIS’s operational presence. However, a key development in this offensive was the lack of support from Somalia’s federal government, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, for Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts.

This raises serious questions about the political and strategic divisions between Puntland and Mogadishu, the effectiveness of U.S. intervention, and the long-term consequences for counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa.

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I. Puntland’s Lone Battle Against ISIS

1. Puntland's Strategic Fight Against Terrorism

Since December 2024, Puntland has been engaged in a self-led military operation to eliminate ISIS cells entrenched in the mountainous terrain of the Bari region. Unlike the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, which operates primarily in southern Somalia, ISIS in Somalia has established bases in Puntland, taking advantage of the region’s rough terrain and limited federal oversight.

Puntland’s government has declared counterterrorism a top priority, recognizing that allowing ISIS to operate freely would:

• Destabilize local governance and threaten Puntland’s political and economic autonomy.
• Increase terror attacks on local leaders, businesses, and civilians.
• Strengthen jihadist recruitment networks, drawing foreign fighters into Puntland.

Despite these threats, the Somali federal government in Mogadishu has not provided any military, logistical, or financial support to Puntland’s offensive against ISIS. Instead, Puntland has had to rely on international partners such as the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to sustain its operations.

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2. Puntland’s Government Statement on the Airstrikes

On February 2, 2025, the Puntland State Government of Somalia released an official press statement following the U.S. airstrikes, acknowledging their significance in the ongoing war against terrorism. The statement expressed deep appreciation for the U.S. and UAE’s support:

“The Puntland government acknowledges and expresses its sincere gratitude to international partners who have extended their support in the ongoing efforts to combat ISIS terrorists in the region. In particular, we appreciate the contributions of the United States and the United Arab Emirates, whose involvement in airstrikes targeting Daesh elements concealed within the Al-Miskat mountains of the Bari region has been invaluable.”

However, notably absent from the statement was any mention of the Somali federal government, further highlighting the growing divide between Mogadishu and Puntland in counterterrorism policy.

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II. The Somali Federal Government’s Lack of Support

1. Why Has Mogadishu Refused to Support Puntland?

The federal government in Mogadishu, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has taken a centralized approach to counterterrorism, prioritizing operations against Al-Shabaab in the south rather than focusing on ISIS in Puntland. Several factors explain this lack of support:

• Political Rivalry: Puntland has long sought greater autonomy from Mogadishu, often operating independently in security matters. The federal government may view supporting Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts as legitimizing its autonomy.
• Competing Priorities: Mogadishu is preoccupied with Al-Shabaab, which poses a direct threat to the capital and central regions. The government may see ISIS in Puntland as a secondary concern.
• Tensions Over Foreign Military Cooperation: The U.S. airstrikes in Puntland were coordinated without Mogadishu’s direct involvement. This could create friction between the Somali government and the U.S., suggesting that Washington bypasses the central government in favor of regional actors.

Mogadishu’s failure to support Puntland’s military efforts raises concerns about the effectiveness of Somalia’s national counterterrorism strategy. If regional and federal authorities are not aligned, terrorist groups could exploit these divisions to strengthen their positions.

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III. The Role of U.S. Airstrikes: A Calculated Intervention?

1. Trump’s Counterterrorism Strategy in Somalia

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has always favored precision strikes over prolonged military engagements, a doctrine that aligns with his “America First” foreign policy. After ordering the Puntland airstrikes, Trump took to Twitter (X) to declare the mission’s success:

“ISIS is on the run in Puntland! We took out a senior attack planner and multiple terrorists in a BIG WIN for Somalia and global security. No civilians harmed. America will always lead the fight against terror!”

Trump’s direct engagement with Puntland, rather than Mogadishu, signals a significant shift in U.S. counterterrorism strategy:

• Supporting localized security forces over national governments.
• Targeting key terrorist leaders instead of long-term troop deployments.
• Maintaining a limited but highly effective military footprint in Africa.

By backing Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. may be indicating that it trusts Puntland’s security strategy more than Mogadishu’s centralized approach.

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IV. The Political and Security Consequences

1. Deepening Rift Between Puntland and Mogadishu

The federal government’s unwillingness to assist Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts could lead to:

• Increased Puntland autonomy: Puntland may seek even greater independence in military and governance matters, further straining relations with Mogadishu.
• A divided national security strategy: Somalia’s war against terrorism requires coordinated efforts between regions and the central government. Without unity, extremist groups may exploit these divisions.

2. Regional Security Ramifications

With ISIS suffering heavy losses in Puntland, the group may:

• Attempt to regroup elsewhere in Somalia, potentially shifting its base to southern or central regions.
• Increase terrorist attacks in urban centers to demonstrate its resilience.
• Strengthen alliances with Al-Shabaab, creating a greater security threat for Somalia and neighboring countries.

Puntland will need continued international support to prevent a resurgence of ISIS fighters and maintain pressure on terrorist networks.

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Conclusion: 

A Pivotal Moment for Somalia’s Counterterrorism Efforts

The U.S. airstrikes in Puntland marked a significant turning point in the war against ISIS in Somalia. The strikes:

✅ Eliminated key ISIS leaders and disrupted terrorist operations.

✅ Reinforced Puntland’s counterterrorism campaign.

✅ Highlighted the growing divide between Puntland and the Somali federal government.

However, the lack of support from Mogadishu raises critical concerns about Somalia’s internal security coordination. Without a unified national counterterrorism strategy, terrorist groups may exploit political divisions to their advantage.

For now, Puntland stands at the frontline of Somalia’s battle against terror, with or without Mogadishu’s backing.

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New Age of Terror: Al-Shabaab's Potential Drone Warfare

In a world where drones have revolutionized modern warfare, the thought of such technology falling into the hands of terrorist organizations is deeply unsettling. Recently, US intelligence has uncovered discussions between the Houthis in Yemen and Al-Shabaab in Somalia regarding the supply of advanced drones. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, over 80% of Houthi drone strikes in Yemen have targeted critical infrastructure, causing significant casualties and damage. This statistic underscores the destructive potential of drone technology and raises alarming questions about what could happen if Al-Shabaab acquires similar capabilities.

Increased Threat to Civilians and Infrastructure

Drones could also be used to target critical infrastructure and civilian areas, causing widespread fear and disruption. The psychological impact of drone strikes creates an environment of constant fear and insecurity, likely leading to increased displacement of civilians and exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation in Somalia. The Houthis have demonstrated their capability and willingness to use drones in Yemen, launching numerous attacks on both military and civilian targets, causing significant damage and casualties. This precedent raises concerns about the extent of damage Al-Shabaab could inflict if they acquire similar technology.

Regional Instability

The ripple effects of this development would not be confined to Somalia. Neighboring countries, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia, would be on high alert for potential drone incursions. The fear of cross-border attacks could heighten regional tensions and lead to an arms race as countries seek to bolster their defenses against aerial threats. Additionally, the presence of drones could complicate international efforts to provide aid and support to affected regions, as aid organizations might face increased risks.

Iranian Involvement: A Geopolitical Concern

Iran's role in supporting the Houthis is well-documented. The United Nations and various international observers have reported on Iran's provision of weapons, training, and financial aid to the Houthis, which has been a critical factor in sustaining their prolonged conflict in Yemen. The possibility of Iranian involvement in supplying drones to Al-Shabaab introduces a new dimension to the conflict. This move could be seen as part of Iran's broader strategy to exert influence in the region and destabilize its rivals. The international community, particularly the United States and its allies, would likely respond with increased sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Iran to curtail its support for terrorist groups.

Comparison to Houthis in Yemen

The Houthis in Yemen have successfully used drones to strengthen their military operations and control significant parts of the country, including the capital, Sanaa. According to a 2023 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Houthis have conducted over 400 drone strikes since 2018, significantly impacting the conflict in Yemen (CSIS, 2023). Drawing a parallel, if Al-Shabaab uses drones similarly, they might achieve a comparable level of control in Somalia. This scenario becomes even more plausible considering Al-Shabaab's historical adaptability and tactical ingenuity. However, the extent of their success would largely depend on the local and international responses to their advancements.

Debate on Al-Shabaab's Potential Control of Central and Southern Somalia

The discussions between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab have sparked a debate on whether Al-Shabaab could capture central and southern Somalia, similar to the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan. This concern is fueled by the increased capabilities that drones would provide to Al-Shabaab, potentially enabling them to exert greater control over these regions. According to VOA News, Al-Shabaab has reversed all Somali National Army gains made in central Somalia over the last two years (

VOA News, 2024).

Drawing parallels with the Taliban's swift and decisive capture of Afghanistan, analysts worry that Al-Shabaab might employ a similar strategy. The Taliban's success was largely due to their ability to exploit the weaknesses of the Afghan government and capitalize on the withdrawal of foreign troops. Similarly, Al-Shabaab could use drones to exploit vulnerabilities within the Somali government and military forces, paving the way for a rapid and aggressive expansion of their control over central and southern Somalia.

Conclusion

The potential for Al-Shabaab to acquire drones from the Houthis represents a significant escalation in the conflict dynamics within Somalia and the broader region. Addressing this threat requires a coordinated and comprehensive approach that balances military, diplomatic, and humanitarian strategies to ensure lasting peace and stability. The international community must act swiftly and decisively to prevent the proliferation of drone technology to terrorist groups and to support efforts aimed at achieving long-term security in the region.

Author: Said Noor

Sources:

1-Babb, Carla. "Al-Shabab reverses Somali force gains, now working with Houthis in Somalia." VOA News. Accessed June 20, 2024.        

https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-reverses-somali-force-gains-is-working-with-houthis-in-somalia-/7659656.html

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2-Robinson, Kali. "Iran’s Support of the Houthis: What to Know." Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed June 20, 2024.

https://www.cfr.org/article/irans-support-houthis-what-know

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3-"U.S. Wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen: What Are The Endstates?" CSIS. Accessed June 20, 2024.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-wars-iraq-syria-libya-and-yemen-what-are-endstates

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4-"The UN Exposes Houthi Reliance on Iranian Weapons." The Washington Institute. Accessed June 20, 2024.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/un-exposes-houthi-reliance-iranian-weapons

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Will Al-Shabaab Negotiate with the Federal Government?

In his 2024 Oslo Forum speech, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia highlighted the government's struggle with international terrorism and recent military successes. He underscored the commitment to peaceful means, including political engagements and amnesty for those renouncing extremism. During a debate in Oslo, he reiterated his readiness for dialogue with al-Shabaab, emphasizing that "peace cannot be achieved by force; it can only be achieved by understanding." His stance reflects a commitment to exploring alternatives beyond military strategies to address the security challenges posed by al-Shabaab.

After two years of fighting al-Shabaab, it seems President Mohamud is back to square one, confronting the same formidable challenges that have plagued his administration and the country.

Criticisms of Negotiation

The idea of negotiating with al-Shabaab has sparked significant debate and criticism. Key criticisms include:

1. Legitimizing Terrorism: Critics argue that negotiating with al-Shabaab could inadvertently legitimize the group's violent tactics and extremist ideology. Engaging in dialogue may be seen as recognizing al-Shabaab as a legitimate political entity, undermining international efforts to combat terrorism. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted, "The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose," reflecting the asymmetrical nature of such conflicts.
2. Undermining Security Efforts: Opponents believe that negotiations could weaken the resolve of Somali and international security forces fighting al-Shabaab. There is concern that talks might lead to a reduction in military pressure on the group, allowing them to regroup and strengthen their operations. Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's quote, "An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last," underscores the fear that negotiating with extremists can embolden them, leading to greater instability.
3. Risk of Incomplete Peace: Negotiations with extremist groups often risk achieving only partial or temporary peace. Al-Shabaab's deeply entrenched ideology and transnational jihadist connections make it unlikely they will fully renounce violence and integrate into a peaceful political process. This could lead to peace agreements being violated, resulting in renewed violence.
4. Moral Hazard: Engaging in negotiations with al-Shabaab might set a dangerous precedent, suggesting that violent insurgency is an effective strategy to gain political concessions. This could inspire other extremist groups in the region to adopt similar tactics, leading to increased instability. Former U.S. President John F. Kennedy stated, "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate," highlighting the delicate balance between negotiating and maintaining a strong stance against terrorism.
5. Non-Recognition of the Constitution: Al-Shabaab does not recognize the country's constitution, which is the law of the land. This fundamental rejection of Somalia’s legal and political framework poses a significant barrier to meaningful negotiation. It is unlikely that al-Shabaab would agree to terms aligning with constitutional and democratic principles upheld by the Federal Government, undermining the rule of law and efforts to establish a stable society.

Comparing Al-Shabaab and the Taliban

Understanding the unique challenges of negotiating with al-Shabaab involves comparing them with the Taliban:

• Origins and Goals: The Taliban originated in Afghanistan with the goal of establishing an Islamic Emirate under their strict interpretation of Sharia law. Al-Shabaab also aims to establish an Islamic state in Somalia but has a more transnational agenda, with strong ties to al-Qaeda and ambitions extending beyond Somali borders.
• Territorial Control: The Taliban have historically controlled significant territories in Afghanistan, establishing quasi-governmental administrative structures. Al-Shabaab, although controlling some regions in Somalia, operates more as an insurgent group with less stable territorial control.
• International Reach: Al-Shabaab has a broader transnational jihadist agenda compared to the Taliban. Their operations have included attacks in neighboring countries like Kenya, indicating a wider operational scope and more global jihadist outlook.
• Severity and Tactics: Both groups are notorious for their brutal tactics, but al-Shabaab has been particularly ruthless in targeting civilians. Their attacks on public spaces, schools, and markets demonstrate a level of brutality that often exceeds that of the Taliban. Incidents like the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, the 2015 Garissa University attack in Kenya, and the 2017 Soobe 1 incident in Mogadishu underscore al-Shabaab's willingness to inflict mass casualties on civilians.

Will Al-Shabaab Negotiate?

While President Mohamud has expressed willingness for dialogue, al-Shabaab's response remains uncertain. Their main goals and ideology include:

• Overthrowing the Central Government: Al-Shabaab seeks to destabilize the Somali Federal Government and replace it with its own rule.
• Expelling Foreign Forces: The group aims to remove foreign military forces from Somalia.
• Establishing an Islamic State: Al-Shabaab’s ultimate goal is to create an Islamic state governed by its interpretation of Sharia law.
• Transnational Jihadist Agenda: With ties to al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab aims to extend its influence beyond Somalia and support global jihadist movements.

Given these goals, it is unclear whether al-Shabaab would genuinely engage in a negotiation process that might require them to abandon their core objectives. Historically, the group has shown little inclination to compromise or seek peaceful solutions, making them a particularly challenging entity for peaceful negotiations.

Conclusion

President Mohamud’s initiative for dialogue reflects a commendable commitment to peace but is fraught with complexities and risks. The international community and Somali citizens remain divided on the merits and potential outcomes of such negotiations. The critical question is whether al-Shabaab will negotiate in good faith or exploit the talks to further its agenda. Lasting peace in Somalia likely requires a multifaceted approach, including dialogue and decisive security measures. As Theodore Roosevelt said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far," highlighting the need for balance in peace efforts.

Sources:

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, keynote speech at the 2024 Oslo Forum.

"Somalia: Deadly Bombing Strikes Mogadishu," The New York Times, October 15, 2017. Available at: The New York Times

"Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya," START Background Report, April 2015. Available at: START

Author: Said Noor

 

Chaos and Controversy: The Battle Over Mogadishu's Cemetery

Oh, the Bulusiya School cemetery in Mogadishu! It's a place where even the dead aren't safe from the government's land grab. Who needs peace and quiet when you can have a shiny new Somali Navy training center, right?

But seriously, it's a pretty somber situation. Families are being forced to spend money to exhume and reinter their loved ones due to the government's decision to repurpose the cemetery land. It's causing a lot of emotional distress and public outcry.

The Somali government has given families a tight deadline to relocate the bodies from the Bulusiya School cemetery. The Defense Minister claims the land is crucial for national interests, but many people are accusing the government of insensitivity and a lack of transparency.

It's a tough situation, and it's understandable why people are upset. I mean, who wants to dig up their loved ones and move them to a new location? It's a lot to ask, especially when it's done without much warning or consideration for the families' feelings.

But hey, at least the Somali Navy will have a nice new training center, right?

In the heart of Mogadishu lies the Bulusiya School cemetery. Located centrally in the Hodan district, near the bustling Bakara Market, this graveyard has silently borne witness to the city's tumultuous past. Established in the late 19th century during the colonial era, it has since become the final resting place for an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 souls. Among those buried here are former leaders, artists, scholars, and poets, including notable figures such as General Salaad Gabayre Kadiye, General Aynanshe, singer Mohamed Suleban Tubec, Abdi Tahlil Warsame, Marshale, and Awkuku. The government's recent directive to exhume bodies from this cemetery, citing concerns over disease transmission and the need for more space in the densely populated city, has ignited significant controversy. Many locals view this decision as a profound disrespect to their ancestors, seeing the graveyard not just as a burial ground but as a crucial part of their cultural and historical heritage. The graveyard's location and history make it a landmark of immense emotional and historical significance, and the debate over its future highlights the delicate balance between development and reverence for the past.

Suitability for Naval Training

But is the graveyard suitable for naval training camp? While it may seem like a strategic location, the reality is far more concerning. The graveyard is situated in the center of the city, surrounded by residents, and its tiny size raises significant questions about its suitability for naval training. The health impacts of living near a graveyard cannot be ignored. Studies have shown that proximity to graveyards can increase the risk of respiratory diseases, mental health issues, and even cancer. Decomposing bodies can lead to the spread of serious diseases like tuberculosis, cholera, dysentery, typhoid, and other waterborne illnesses. Furthermore, the leaching of decomposing material into groundwater can contaminate the water supply, posing long-term health risks to both naval personnel and the local population. The psychological impact of living near a graveyard is equally troubling, contributing to anxiety and stress among residents. Considering these factors, the suitability of a graveyard for naval training is highly questionable due to the potential health risks for personnel. It is crucial to prioritize the well-being of our naval trainees by seeking alternative sites that do not pose such severe health and environmental hazards.

Alternative Strategic Locations

While the Bulusiya School cemetery is central, other strategic locations should be considered for naval training. If the president is sincere in addressing this matter, Somalia's extensive coastline, the longest in Africa, presents several viable alternatives. Given that much of the southern and central coast of Somalia is controlled by Al-Shabaab, Puntland emerges as the best option, offering a considerable coastline suitable for naval training facilities. Important factors such as accessibility, security, and existing infrastructure should be prioritized when selecting the location. The graveyard in Mogadishu is not merely a burial site but a repository of rich history and cultural heritage. The government's decision to disinter the dead may stem from practical motives, yet it is crucial to recognize the cultural and emotional significance of the cemetery to the local community. Alternative strategic locations for naval training comp should be explored to avoid harming or disrespecting the community. As Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Noor pointed out, the country’s naval coast guard will be stationed there. This situation requires carefully balancing progress with respect for historical and cultural heritage; however, the current approach appears to be leaning toward chaos and controversy.

Author: Said Noor