How the Iran–US–Israel Conflict Is Reshaping Somali Livelihoods

By Said Noor

Crossroads Politics: A Political Analysis

The escalating confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel may appear geographically distant from Somalia’s arid rangelands, bustling ports, and informal settlements. Yet this conflict is tightly interwoven with the economic structures, security arrangements, and diplomatic relationships that shape daily life in Somalia, influencing food prices, trade, political stability, and household resilience.[10][11]

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1. Strategic Geography: Somalia at the Crossroads of Red Sea Security

Somalia’s coastline stretches along the Gulf of Aden and near the southern entrance to the Red Sea, placing it adjacent to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a vital chokepoint linking Asia, Africa, and Europe. An estimated 10–12% of international maritime trade passes through this corridor, including a substantial share of global oil and dry goods shipped via the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Any disruption here—whether from military escalation, attacks on shipping, or proxy confrontations—can reverberate across global supply chains and directly affect countries like Somalia that depend on seaborne imports.[12][13]

Recent diplomatic developments have sharpened these stakes. On 26 December 2025, Israel officially recognized Somaliland, the self-declared independent region in northern Somalia, establishing full diplomatic relations and becoming the first country to do so. Mogadishu condemned the move as an attack on Somalia’s sovereignty, while Iran denounced it as a “flagrant violation” and part of a broader Israeli strategy to exacerbate insecurity in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Regional powers, including Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar also criticized the decision, underscoring how recognition of Somaliland has become entangled in wider Middle Eastern rivalries.[14][15]

These moves are not merely symbolic. Analysts describe how Israel, India, the UAE, and Ethiopia are converging around Somaliland and nearby ports as part of a new Red Sea axis aimed at securing maritime routes and countering rival influences, including Iran’s presence in the Red Sea corridor. For Somalia, this intensifying competition over ports, naval facilities, and maritime security means that its coastal waters are increasingly patrolled, surveilled, and militarized by external powers, with local politics and sovereignty debates folded into a global power game.[15][16][17][18]

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2. Trade Disruptions and Deepening Economic Vulnerabilities

Somalia’s economy is structurally import-dependent. Domestic cereal production meets only about 22% of per capita needs, leaving roughly 60–70% of staple food consumption reliant on imported rice, wheat, and sugar. The country also depends heavily on imported fuel, machinery, and construction materials, contributing to a persistent trade deficit in which the value of imports far exceeds exports and absorbs much of the inward remittance inflows from the diaspora.[19][20]

In this context, any instability in Middle Eastern waters has immediate economic consequences. Tension around the Bab al-Mandeb raises security risks for shipping, prompting higher insurance premiums and route adjustments that increase freight costs. The Bab al-Mandeb and Suez Canal carry a significant share of global oil and dry goods, so disruptions or perceived threats in this corridor can simultaneously drive up global energy prices and shipping costs. For Somalia, which imports most of its fuel and key food staples, higher freight and fuel costs translate into rising prices for transport, electricity, and basic commodities.[13][20][12][19]

Analyses of Somalia’s food system for 2024–2025 show how this vulnerability plays out. As domestic harvests lag and climate shocks persist, the country’s food availability hinges on commercial imports and humanitarian assistance, leaving it highly exposed to fluctuations in global markets and aid flows. When shipping or energy prices spike due to conflict in the Middle East, wholesale traders face higher costs that cascade down to local markets, where households already living on thin margins are forced to reduce consumption, switch to cheaper and less nutritious foods, or take on debt. At the macro level, the widening trade deficit—driven in large part by imports of food, fuel, and construction materials—consumes remittances that might otherwise support investment in productive sectors.[20][19]

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3. Geopolitics Feeding Local Security and Political Tensions

The Iran–US–Israel confrontation is nested within a broader set of rivalries involving Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar), Turkey, Egypt, and major powers like China, all of which have growing footprints in the Horn of Africa. These states extend their competition into Somalia through aid, investment, port concessions, military bases, and political sponsorship.[17][12][15]

Somalia’s dependence on external security and financial assistance gives outside actors significant leverage over internal politics. Studies on Somalia’s trade and food systems highlight how the country’s limited capacity to produce goods and collect revenue forces it to rely on external assistance and commercial imports, which in turn shape policy choices and alliances. Port and basing deals along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden—such as those involving Djibouti, Berbera in Somaliland, and other coastal facilities—are often negotiated within the broader context of securing shipping routes and countering rivals like Iran, sometimes sidelining Somali priorities.[16][18][15][17][19][20]

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, for instance, has been interpreted by some analysts as part of a Red Sea power game designed to create new alignments that favor Israel and its partners while complicating Iran’s ability to project influence via the Red Sea corridor. Iran’s sharp condemnation of this step, describing it as an expansionist move that threatens regional security, illustrates how Somali territorial and political questions have become entangled with Middle Eastern strategic agendas.[14][15][16]

These dynamics deepen internal cleavages. Differing relationships with the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia can pull Somali factions and federal member states in competing directions, complicating efforts to build coherent national institutions and a unified security sector. As external patrons back different elites, disputes over recognition, port deals, and security cooperation can fuel local factionalism and increase the risk that Somali territory becomes a stage for proxy competition.[15][17][20]

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4. Social Stress, Everyday Survival, and Resilience Under Strain

On the ground, Somali communities face overlapping stresses: climate shocks, displacement, limited access to services, and market volatility. Studies of Somalia’s food system depict a country where markets are stocked and ships arrive, yet rural land that once sustained much of the population is being abandoned, and livelihoods are increasingly dependent on imports and aid. In this fragile context, external geopolitical tensions amplify existing vulnerabilities.[19]

When global prices and shipping costs rise due to risks in the Red Sea or Gulf waters, households experience a squeeze in purchasing power, especially in urban and peri-urban areas where people rely on markets rather than subsistence production. The trade deficit and reliance on imports for essential goods like food and fuel mean that even modest external shocks can quickly translate into higher domestic prices. For many families, this means cutting meals, withdrawing children from school to save costs or generate income, selling productive assets, or migrating in search of work, all of which erode long-term resilience.[20][19]

At the same time, humanitarian and development funding is vulnerable to shifts in donor priorities. International analyses note that Somalia’s persistent dependence on external assistance reflects deeper structural weaknesses in domestic institutions and revenue systems. When geopolitical crises divert attention and budgets toward security and strategic competition—such as securing the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea corridor—resources for long-term resilience, social services, and climate adaptation in places like Somalia can be squeezed, leaving local communities to shoulder the fallout of decisions made far away.[12][17][19]

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5. A Region in Flux: Somalia in an Interconnected Order

The interplay between Middle Eastern conflicts and Somali livelihoods underscores that Somalia is part of a larger strategic ecosystem spanning the Red Sea, Gulf, and Western capitals. Analysts describe the Bab al-Mandeb as a key node in global supply chains, where events such as the Ever Given incident in the Suez Canal exposed how quickly disruptions in this corridor can generate billions of dollars in daily trade losses. In such a tightly coupled system, a naval standoff or attack in one part of the route can affect shipping schedules, freight rates, and insurance costs across the entire chain.[13][17][12]

For Somalia, whose food system and trade balance are shaped more by global markets than by domestic production or rainfall, this interconnectedness is both an opportunity and a profound risk. Its strategic location attracts interest and investment from powers seeking port access, military presence, and influence over Red Sea governance, but its weak institutions, heavy import dependence, and internal divisions make it vulnerable to being pulled into rival blocs.[16][17][15][19][20]

These realities mean that community-level resilience and national policy reforms, while essential, are not sufficient on their own. A broader diplomatic and regional strategy is needed—one that links de-escalation efforts in the Iran–US–Israel arena to concrete measures that protect Red Sea shipping, stabilize energy and freight markets, and ensure that security cooperation with Horn of Africa states supports inclusive development rather than deepening fragmentation.[18][17][12][15]

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Conclusion: Interconnected Futures and Policy Imperatives

The Iran–US–Israel conflict, though geographically distant from Somali villages and urban neighborhoods, is tightly linked to the country’s economic prospects, security trajectory, and political evolution. Somalia’s growing reliance on imported staples, its widening trade deficit, and its dependence on external assistance tie local livelihoods to the stability of maritime corridors like the Bab al-Mandeb and to the strategic calculations of distant capitals.[12][13][19][20]

For Somali policymakers, regional leaders, international partners, and the Somali diaspora, recognizing these linkages is essential. It enables more prudent management of external partnerships, better anticipation of price and supply shocks, and more targeted investments in domestic food production, revenue systems, and social protection. In an era when decisions in Washington, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Ankara, and Abu Dhabi can alter freight routes and food prices in Bosaso, Mogadishu or Baidoa within weeks, Somali futures are inseparable from the wider geopolitical currents that define the twenty‑first century.[17][15][16][19][20]

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Sources

Guled, Abdi. “Somalia’s Food System Is Growing More Dependent on Imports.” LinkedIn.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/somalias-food-system-growing-more-dependent-imports-abdi-guled-v27ue

Hiiraan Online. “Somalia’s Trade Deficit Widens, Consuming Total Inward Remittances as Economic Disparities Grow Over Six Years.”
https://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2024/Aug/197673/somalia_s_trade_deficit_widens_consuming_total_inward_remittances_as_economic_disparities_grow_over_six_years.aspx

Coface. “Bab el-Mandeb Strait: Chokepoint Threatens Global Trade.”
https://www.coface.ch/news-publications-insights/bab-el-mandeb-strait-tension-at-a-global-trade-route

The Cradle. “A New Red Sea Axis: Israel, India, UAE, Ethiopia Converge in Somaliland.”
https://thecradle.co/articles/a-new-red-sea-axis-israel-india-uae-ethiopia-converge-in-somaliland

Middle East Institute. “The Bab el-Mandeb Strait: Regional and Great Power Rivalries on the Shores of the Red Sea.”
https://mei.edu/publication/bab-el-mandeb-strait-regional-and-great-power-rivalries-shores-red-sea

MEPEI. “The Geopolitical Importance of Bab el-Mandeb Strait – A Strategic Gateway to Global Trade.”
https://mepei.com/the-geopolitical-importance-of-bab-el-mandeb-strait-a-strategic-gateway-to-global-trade/

Anadolu Agency. “Iran Slams Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland as ‘Flagrant Violation’ of Somalia’s Sovereignty.”
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/iran-slams-israel-s-recognition-of-somaliland-as-flagrant-violation-of-somalia-s-sovereignty/3782671

Osman, Abdullahi Ilyas. “Somalia’s Maritime Security Affected by Bab al-Mandab and Strait of Hormuz.” LinkedIn.
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/abdullahi-ilyas-osman-25525813a_research-maritimesecurity-geopolitics-activity-7425141062723203072-v0wy

FMES Institute. “The Red Sea Power Game: Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Contest for Influence in the Horn of Africa.”
https://fmes-france.org/the-red-sea-power-game-israels-recognition-of-somaliland-and-the-contest-for-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa/

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐊𝐢𝐬𝐦𝐚𝐲𝐨 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐪𝐮𝐞́: 𝐀 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐏𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐭 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐒𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐢

𝐂𝐫𝐨𝐬𝐬𝐫𝐨𝐚𝐝𝐬 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬: 𝐀 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬

𝐁𝐲 𝐒𝐚𝐢𝐝 𝐍𝐨𝐨𝐫

𝐃𝐞𝐜𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝟐𝟎, 𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟓 – 𝐊𝐢𝐬𝐦𝐚𝐲𝐨

The 𝐒𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐢 𝐅𝐮𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐥 held a high-level political conference in Kismayo from December 18 to 20, 2025. The meeting brought together people from both houses of the Federal Parliament, former national leaders, politicians from inside and outside Somalia, and civil society groups.

The meeting concluded with a lengthy communiqué (Warmurtiyeed) that expresses great concern about Somalia's political direction and proposes clear solutions for political, constitutional, and security issues.

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𝟏. 𝐀𝐧 𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐒𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐚’𝐬 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐂𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐬

The Communiqué makes it clear that Somalia is in the middle of a national crisis on many levels: political, constitutional, security, economic, and humanitarian.

The conference said that the current federal government has:

• Did not uphold constitutional governance

• Political polarization has gotten worse

• Weakened federalism and the independence of institutions

• Put the country in a state of long-term uncertainty and stagnation

The communiqué states that poor leadership has made the country less united and placed additional strain on Somalia's fragile political order.

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𝟐. 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐬 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐥𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐚𝐜𝐲 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧

The Communiqué emphasizes the breach of the Provisional Constitution (2012). The conference says that the federal government is to blame for:

• Weakening the separation of powers

• Disrupting constitutional institutions

• Governing hookups through unilateral choices instead of agreement

Most importantly, the conference says clearly that it will not extend any mandates:

• The House of the People will be in office until April 14, 2026

• The president’s term ends on May 15, 2026

Any extension beyond these dates is deemed unconstitutional, perilous, and a catalyst for increased instability.

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𝟑. 𝐒𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐛𝐥𝐞𝐦𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐓𝐞𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐦

The Communiqué talks about how security has gotten much worse, especially with the return of Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

The conference says that this return is directly related to:

• Failure of policy

• Bad coordination

• Uncertainty in leadership

According to the Communiqué, the result has been:

• More attacks

• Deaths of civilians

• Loss of faith in the public

• More room to operate for extremist groups

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𝟒. 𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐜 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐇𝐮𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐃𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧

The Communiqué talks about worsening economic and humanitarian conditions, in addition to politics and security. These include:

• Inflation and poverty are on the rise

• Destruction of resources in the country

• Weak systems for collecting taxes

• The state is unable to fulfill its fundamental responsibilities

The conference asserts that the failure of the elite in politics has left the Somali people bearing the consequences.

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𝟓. 𝐄𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬, 𝐅𝐞𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐦, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐁𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐫

The conference strongly supports elections that are open to everyone and obey the Constitution. It also warns against:

• One-sided electoral arrangements

• Making electoral bodies political

• Holding elections in the Banadir Region without national agreement

The Communiqué says that Federal Member States must be able to hold elections according to constitutional and agreed-upon rules, without any interference from the federal government.

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𝟔. 𝐀 𝐂𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐈𝐦𝐦𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧

One of the main resolutions calls for a full national political meeting to be held by January 20, 2026, at the latest. The meeting should aim to:

• Finding common ground on elections

• Staying away from a constitutional vacuum

• Stopping the breakdown of politics and security

The Communiqué cautions that in the absence of action, the Somali Future Council will need to undertake additional political measures to safeguard the rule of law.

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𝟕. 𝐀𝐬𝐤 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐒𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐢 𝐩𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐥𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐰𝐨𝐫𝐥𝐝 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐡𝐞𝐥𝐩

The Communiqué issues two urgent appeals:

To the people of Somalia:

• Protect the sovereignty of the nation

• Don't accept extremism

• Come together against terrorism

• Demand a government that follows the Constitution

To the world:

• Back solutions led by Somalis

• Don't allow unconstitutional extensions

• Put pressure on leaders to protect civilians and the democratic process

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𝟖. 𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐌𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐈𝐬 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭

This isn't just a political statement; it's a warning sign.

The Kismayo Communiqué shows that Somali politicians are starting to agree on the following:

• The current situation cannot last

• You can't just make up legitimacy

• Law, agreement, and responsibility are all necessary for stability

How Somalia's leaders and partners respond in the coming months will determine whether this document is a turning point or just another missed chance.

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𝐅𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐓𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡𝐭𝐬

The Kismayo Communiqué is a serious effort to steer Somalia away from constitutional breakdown and toward a legal political transition. It puts the blame squarely on leaders, institutions, and citizens.

Somalia is at a crossroads right now:
Whether it's the rule of law or the rule of delay, it's a matter of agreement or failure.

THE KISMAYO CONFERENCE: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT?

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Political Analyst | Said Noor

The Somali Future Council Conference officially opened today in Kismayo, a city that has once again become the focal point of national politics. The conference brings together a high-profile gathering of former presidents, former prime ministers, leaders of federal member states, particularly Puntland and Jubaland, as well as more than 80 federal members of parliament.

This level of participation gives the meeting significant national weight, especially as it coincides with the end of the constitutional term of the Federal President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

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Political Context of the Conference

Ahead of the conference’s official opening, the President of Puntland, Said Abdullahi Deni, delivered a strong political message that clearly framed the spirit and direction of the meeting. He stated:

“The current government remains in power through granted legitimacy, not through real authority. It is dragging on without a future; this path has been seen before. Alternative solutions are emerging that better serve the collective interests of the Somali people.”

This statement clearly reflects the political stance of the conference and the broader struggle it represents.

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What the Kismayo Conference Is Challenging

The conference directly and indirectly challenges the current administration in Mogadishu by:

• Questioning the legitimacy of term extensions and unilateral approaches to the electoral process

• Reuniting fragmented political opposition, creating a more coordinated front

• Sending a clear message to the international community that one-sided elections are unacceptable

In this sense, Kismayo is not merely hosting a meeting—it is hosting a political reckoning.

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What Outcomes Are Expected?

Several key results are anticipated from the conference, including:

• A national political communiqué (the “Kismayo Statement”) outlining shared positions

• Explicit political backing for Jubaland, strengthening its negotiating position

• Reactivation of the Somali Future Council as an organized political platform

• A strategic political roadmap for the next phase of political engagement

• Momentum toward a broader national conference, potentially larger and more consequential than the one held in Gunaane

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Why Kismayo Matters

Kismayo has effectively transformed into the center of political realignment in Somalia. It is here that strategies are being shaped around electoral legitimacy, leadership legality, and the future political order of the country.

The conference signals that Somalia has entered a decisive phase—one where political actors are no longer willing to accept ambiguity in governance, elections, or constitutional authority. What emerges from Kismayo may very well determine the direction of Somalia’s political future in the months ahead.

 

The Escalating Airspace and E-Visa Dispute in Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland

By Said Noor | November 2025

Tags: Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, ICAO, Airspace Dispute, E-Visa, Horn of Africa, Aviation Safety, Federalism, Geopolitics

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Introduction

The airspace and e-visa dispute among Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland has rapidly intensified, exposing the fragile balance between sovereignty, security, and governance in the Horn of Africa.
What began as a technical disagreement over flight regulation and immigration management has evolved into a high-stakes political standoff with implications for aviation safety, regional stability, and federal cohesion.

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The Emerging Somalia–Somaliland–Puntland Airspace and E-Visa Dispute

In late October and early November 2025, the long-running question of who controls Somali skies re-emerged.

On October 31, 2025, the Somali Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) in Mogadishu issued a directive requiring all airlines operating anywhere within Somali territory—including Hargeisa—to ensure passengers obtain a Somali e-Visa before boarding. The policy was justified as a national security and immigration control measure, asserting the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction.

Two days later, Somaliland’s Ministry of Civil Aviation and Airports Development (MOCAAD) issued a counter-directive mandating Overflight and Landing Permits for any aircraft entering what it considers Somaliland’s airspace. Citing the Chicago Convention (1944), Hargeisa framed this as an exercise of its sovereign right to regulate aviation, effectively rejecting Mogadishu’s claim.

At the same time, the Puntland State of Somalia rejected the e-visa initiative outright. Officials in Garowe declared that the federal government has “no administrative control” over airports in Garowe, Bosaso, and Qardho. They denounced the e-visa policy as an “illegal checkpoint in the sky,” insisting on maintaining visa-on-arrival procedures.

Together, these moves expose a deep fracture within Somalia’s federal structure—one where airspace, borders, and migration have become symbols of competing legitimacy.

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Airspace Control Conflict

Somaliland’s order—effective November 10, 2025—requires all aircraft to seek prior overflight clearance. Though officially described as a safety measure, the rule functions as a political assertion of independence.
Mogadishu, the internationally recognized government, condemned it as illegal and warned that dual control centers could threaten aviation safety.

Pilots flying through the Mogadishu Flight Information Region (FIR) have already reported conflicting radio instructions near Hargeisa, prompting ICAO safety advisories urging compliance only with Mogadishu Control. Such confusion underscores the risk of mid-air incidents in one of Africa’s busiest transit corridors linking the Middle East and East Africa.

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E-Visa System Dispute

The federal government’s electronic visa platform aimed to digitize entry processes and strengthen border management. Instead, it has magnified internal divisions:

• Somaliland rejects the e-visa outright, insisting that visa issuance is a matter of independent sovereignty.

• Puntland calls the system unconstitutional and continues to issue visas on arrival.

• Mogadishu maintains that only the federal system has legal standing under international law.

Airlines now face contradictory orders from rival authorities, leading to delays, denied boardings, and operational uncertainty—an unsustainable situation for both domestic and international carriers.

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Regional and International Implications

The dispute extends beyond Somali politics. Ethiopia’s quiet support for Somaliland and Puntland’s autonomous positions—through investment deals and diplomatic backing—has inflamed tensions with Mogadishu.
Neighboring countries such as Djibouti and Kenya, which rely on shared flight corridors, fear that conflicting control zones could disrupt regional air navigation.

The episode risks transforming Somalia’s airspace into a contested regional arena, with potential spillover effects on trade, tourism, and humanitarian logistics.

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How ICAO and Neighboring States Could Mediate

A sustainable solution requires technical mediation led by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and regional diplomacy by neighboring states.

 ICAO’s Role

• Neutral Technical Framework: Provide a safety-focused platform detached from political recognition.

• Joint Management Model: Revive the Istanbul II Communiqué structure—shared oversight under ICAO supervision.

• Formal Complaint Process: Utilize Article 84 of the Chicago Convention to investigate unauthorized transmissions or unsafe operations.

• Binding Arbitration: Allow ICAO’s Council to issue recommendations; appeals may go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if all sides agree.

 Neighboring States’ Mediation

• Diplomatic Facilitation: Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya can host dialogue platforms and shuttle diplomacy.

• Trilateral Summits: Convene the aviation authorities of the federal government, Somaliland, and Puntland, along with their foreign-affairs ministries, to harmonize protocols.

• Incentive Measures: Align regional air-traffic or visa agreements with ICAO standards to encourage compliance.

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Recommended Steps Forward

1. Reinstate a Joint Airspace Committee with equal representation from Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Garowe.

2. Create a Unified but Decentralized E-Visa System that integrates regional databases while respecting local autonomy.

3. Seek ICAO Arbitration if bilateral talks fail, ensuring adherence to international norms.

4. Engage the UN and African Union as neutral guarantors, pairing diplomatic mediation with technical oversight.

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Conclusion

The current airspace and e-visa crisis reflects Somalia’s unresolved federal tensions—a contest between central authority and regional autonomy projected into the skies.
Without coordinated management, the dispute threatens aviation safety, economic connectivity, and international credibility.

A balanced framework—anchored in ICAO’s technical neutrality and regional cooperation—offers the best route toward restoring confidence, protecting passengers, and safeguarding the sovereignty and stability of the Horn of Africa’s airspace.

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Suggested SEO Keywords: Somalia airspace dispute, Somaliland aviation, Puntland e-visa, ICAO mediation, Somali federalism, Horn of Africa aviation safety, Mogadishu FIR, Chicago Convention, regional diplomacy

Can the Federal Government Recognize SSC, Khaatumo Without Puntland’s Approval?

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📌 Introduction

The Federal Government of Somalia has ignited new controversy after signaling its intention to recognize Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) — also referred to as Khaatumo — as a federal member state. While this move may seem like a step toward broader inclusion, it has stirred political tensions with Puntland, which constitutionally claims SSC as part of its territory.

In this blog post, I explore the legal, political, and security consequences of this move. 

Can SSC truly become a federal member without Puntland’s approval? Let’s dig in.

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📜 I. What the Constitution Says

Somalia’s Provisional Constitution offers a roadmap for forming federal states:

Article 49(6): "Two or more regions may voluntarily merge to form a Federal Member State."

But here’s the problem — SSC is not composed of two or more independent regions. It is already part of Puntland, a recognized federal member.

That means SSC does not meet the requirement for standalone federal statehood under Article 49(6).

📎 Additional Violations If SSC Is Recognized Unilaterally:

• Article 50(1a): Federal and state governments must consult on governance

• Article 54: Power and resource sharing can only occur via negotiation

And importantly:

Article 142(1): Federal member states that existed before the current Constitution (like Puntland, established 1998) retain their powers until a permanent constitution is finalized.

🛑 In short: Puntland’s territorial integrity cannot be ignored.

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📣 II. Puntland’s Legal and Political Stand

On July 16, 2025, Puntland responded clearly: SSC is part of its constitutional territory.

Puntland’s own constitution (Articles 7 and 138) enshrines Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn as part of its domain. SSC communities have historically been involved in Puntland’s institutions — including Parliament, the Cabinet, and the Judiciary.

Puntland argues:

• No region can be separated from it without a legal process

• The Federal Government is breaching constitutional limits

• The move is politically motivated, aimed at influencing the 2026 elections

🗺️ Article 138 of the Puntland Constitution sets strict conditions:

• Parliamentary approval

• Public consultation

• Clear legal frameworks

None of these have happened.

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🏛️ III. The Lasanod Conference: Illegal Federal Interference?

Puntland accuses the Federal Government of funding and orchestrating the Lasanod conference — which it considers a direct intrusion into its territory.

Yes, Puntland supported the 2023 uprising against Somaliland. But it insists that this doesn’t justify inventing a new state from within Puntland borders.

📉 The risk? Legal breakdown, political fragmentation, and chaos.

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⚠️ IV. Consequences If SSC Is Recognized Unilaterally

🧨 Possible Fallout:

• Erosion of federal trust and unity

• Armed conflict or social unrest

• Somaliland might reassert control over Lasanod

• Radical groups like Al-Shabaab could exploit instability

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🧭 V. What Should SSC Do to Become a Legitimate Federal State?

SSC can’t skip the rules. Here’s what’s required:

1. Build a unified, competent administration

2. Ensure territorial peace and stability

3. Enter structured dialogue with Puntland

4. Collaborate transparently with FGS

5. Support a constitutional review process

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✅ Conclusion

Federalism isn’t just a political slogan — it’s a system grounded in law and mutual respect.

Somalia’s future depends on honoring this structure. SSC’s membership must come from legal dialogue, regional consent, and national unity — not force or political manipulation.

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📝 Final Thoughts

SSC has shown resilience since the Lasanod rebellion. But federal status requires more than military gains or campaign promises.

It needs legal legitimacy and broad consensus.

Puntland’s objections aren’t mere politics — they reflect real fears of constitutional collapse and regional chaos.

📰 Blog Analysis by Said Noor | July 2025

 

Lessons from Puntland: A Strategy for the Federal Government to Defeat Al-Shabaab

Author: Said Noor

Introduction

The continued presence of Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia remains one of the most pressing security concerns for the Somali federal government. Despite ongoing military operations, the militant group retains control over vast territories and frequently carries out attacks against government officials and civilians. The March 18, 2025, attack on President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy near Villa Somalia underscores the persistence of this threat.

In contrast, Puntland successfully eliminated Daesh (ISIS-Somalia) in the Cal Miskaat Mountains within two months in 2025, demonstrating a more effective counterterrorism strategy. This article examines Puntland’s approach and outlines how the Somali federal government can adapt this model to defeat Al-Shabaab through a comprehensive national defense plan.

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Background: The Al-Shabaab Threat and Federal Government’s Approach

Current Counterterrorism Efforts in Southern Somalia

The Somali National Army (SNA), supported by regional forces, clan militias, and international allies, has conducted several offensives against Al-Shabaab. President Mohamud’s administration has emphasized military action, particularly in central and southern regions. However, despite these efforts, Al-Shabaab remains resilient due to:

• Fragmented military strategy – Disconnected regional operations without a unified command.
• Limited coordination with local forces – Unlike Puntland’s effective use of community-led intelligence, federal forces struggle to integrate local militias.
• Tactical adaptability of Al-Shabaab – The group shifts between conventional and guerrilla tactics, allowing it to survive military pressure.

The Attack on President Mohamud: A Case Study in Security Challenges

According to Reuters, Al-Shabaab targeted President Mohamud’s convoy as it traveled towards Mogadishu’s airport. The attack, which killed at least four people, was later claimed by the group on its Telegram channel (Reuters, 2025).

Presidential adviser Zakariye Hussein later confirmed that the president was unharmed and continued to the front lines, reinforcing his commitment to counterterrorism efforts.

Strategic Implications of the Attack

1. Challenge to Government Authority – Directly targeting the president signals Al-Shabaab’s continued defiance.
2. Undermining Public Confidence – Frequent high-profile attacks discourage investment and weaken public trust in security measures (Marchal, 2011).
3. Exposure of Security Gaps – The ability to attack near a fortified location suggests potential intelligence failures or insider involvement.

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Puntland’s Counterterrorism Success Against Daesh in 2025

How Puntland Defeated Daesh in 60 Days

In early 2025, ISIS-affiliated militants attempted to establish a base in the Cal Miskaat Mountains of Puntland. However, within two months, Puntland forces successfully eliminated them using a well-coordinated and intelligence-driven strategy:

• A Unified Military Command – Puntland’s security forces acted under a centralized plan, ensuring operational efficiency.
• Rapid Deployment of Counterterrorism Units – Puntland launched swift and precise military actions instead of prolonged operations.
• Community Engagement and Intelligence Sharing – Puntland authorities encouraged local populations to report militant activity, effectively disrupting Daesh’s networks.

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How the Federal Government Can Apply Puntland’s Strategy

To effectively defeat Al-Shabaab, the federal government must shift from short-term offensives to a structured national defense plan. This requires:

1. Establishing a Unified National Defense Strategy

• Integrate federal, regional, and clan-based forces into a cohesive military structure.
• Develop a centralized command system to ensure effective coordination between units.

2. Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

• Invest in local intelligence networks, following Puntland’s model of community-based reporting.
• Strengthen counterterrorism coordination between national security agencies and international partners.

3. Deploying Permanent Security Forces in Reclaimed Areas

• Instead of temporary military operations, establish permanent security posts in areas freed from Al-Shabaab control.
• Provide local governance and social services to prevent Al-Shabaab from regaining influence.

4. Learning from Puntland’s Rapid Response Model

• Train elite rapid-response counterterrorism units capable of launching highly targeted operations against Al-Shabaab leaders.
• Improve logistical support and mobility to ensure troops can respond quickly to emerging threats.

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Conclusion

The federal government’s current strategy against Al-Shabaab has yielded limited success due to fragmentation, intelligence weaknesses, and lack of a unified national defense plan. Puntland’s successful elimination of Daesh in 2025 demonstrates that a coordinated, intelligence-led, and community-supported approach can effectively dismantle militant networks.

To replicate Puntland’s success, the Somali federal government must adopt a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that prioritizes unified command, intelligence gathering, and permanent security deployments. Only by learning from Puntland’s rapid and decisive operations can Somalia hope to eliminate Al-Shabaab and secure long-term stability.

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References

• Botha, A., & Abdile, M. (2019). Radicalization and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia. Institute for Security Studies.
• Brookings Institution. (2023). Somalia’s Counterterrorism Strategy Under President Mohamud.
• Bryden, M. (2022). Somalia’s Security Sector Reform: Challenges and Prospects. CSIS.
• Crisis Group. (2023). Somalia’s War Against Al-Shabaab: Challenges and Opportunities.
• Hansen, S. J. (2013). Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012. Oxford University Press.
• Hiraal Institute. (2024). Security Risks in Mogadishu: Al-Shabaab’s Evolving Tactics.
• International Crisis Group. (2024). Security Risks in Mogadishu: Al-Shabaab’s Evolving Tactics.
• Marchal, R. (2011). The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in Somalia. African Security Review, 20(2), 47-57.
• Reuters. (2025). Somali Militants Target Presidential Convoy in Bomb Attack, President Safe.
• Wikipedia. (2024). Puntland’s Counterterrorism Success Against ISIS-Somalia in Cal Miskaat Mountains.
• Williams, P. (2021). Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2021. Oxford University Press.

 

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Puntland's Fight Against Terror: How U.S. Airstrikes Shift the Balance

By Said Noor

Introduction: 

A Strategic Shift in Somalia’s Counterterrorism Battle

On February 1, 2025, former U.S. President Donald Trump ordered precision airstrikes targeting ISIS militants in Puntland, Somalia. The operation, focused on Al-Miskat hideouts in the Bari region, was conducted in coordination with Puntland’s government, significantly weakening ISIS’s operational presence. However, a key development in this offensive was the lack of support from Somalia’s federal government, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, for Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts.

This raises serious questions about the political and strategic divisions between Puntland and Mogadishu, the effectiveness of U.S. intervention, and the long-term consequences for counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa.

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I. Puntland’s Lone Battle Against ISIS

1. Puntland's Strategic Fight Against Terrorism

Since December 2024, Puntland has been engaged in a self-led military operation to eliminate ISIS cells entrenched in the mountainous terrain of the Bari region. Unlike the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, which operates primarily in southern Somalia, ISIS in Somalia has established bases in Puntland, taking advantage of the region’s rough terrain and limited federal oversight.

Puntland’s government has declared counterterrorism a top priority, recognizing that allowing ISIS to operate freely would:

• Destabilize local governance and threaten Puntland’s political and economic autonomy.
• Increase terror attacks on local leaders, businesses, and civilians.
• Strengthen jihadist recruitment networks, drawing foreign fighters into Puntland.

Despite these threats, the Somali federal government in Mogadishu has not provided any military, logistical, or financial support to Puntland’s offensive against ISIS. Instead, Puntland has had to rely on international partners such as the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to sustain its operations.

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2. Puntland’s Government Statement on the Airstrikes

On February 2, 2025, the Puntland State Government of Somalia released an official press statement following the U.S. airstrikes, acknowledging their significance in the ongoing war against terrorism. The statement expressed deep appreciation for the U.S. and UAE’s support:

“The Puntland government acknowledges and expresses its sincere gratitude to international partners who have extended their support in the ongoing efforts to combat ISIS terrorists in the region. In particular, we appreciate the contributions of the United States and the United Arab Emirates, whose involvement in airstrikes targeting Daesh elements concealed within the Al-Miskat mountains of the Bari region has been invaluable.”

However, notably absent from the statement was any mention of the Somali federal government, further highlighting the growing divide between Mogadishu and Puntland in counterterrorism policy.

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II. The Somali Federal Government’s Lack of Support

1. Why Has Mogadishu Refused to Support Puntland?

The federal government in Mogadishu, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has taken a centralized approach to counterterrorism, prioritizing operations against Al-Shabaab in the south rather than focusing on ISIS in Puntland. Several factors explain this lack of support:

• Political Rivalry: Puntland has long sought greater autonomy from Mogadishu, often operating independently in security matters. The federal government may view supporting Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts as legitimizing its autonomy.
• Competing Priorities: Mogadishu is preoccupied with Al-Shabaab, which poses a direct threat to the capital and central regions. The government may see ISIS in Puntland as a secondary concern.
• Tensions Over Foreign Military Cooperation: The U.S. airstrikes in Puntland were coordinated without Mogadishu’s direct involvement. This could create friction between the Somali government and the U.S., suggesting that Washington bypasses the central government in favor of regional actors.

Mogadishu’s failure to support Puntland’s military efforts raises concerns about the effectiveness of Somalia’s national counterterrorism strategy. If regional and federal authorities are not aligned, terrorist groups could exploit these divisions to strengthen their positions.

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III. The Role of U.S. Airstrikes: A Calculated Intervention?

1. Trump’s Counterterrorism Strategy in Somalia

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has always favored precision strikes over prolonged military engagements, a doctrine that aligns with his “America First” foreign policy. After ordering the Puntland airstrikes, Trump took to Twitter (X) to declare the mission’s success:

“ISIS is on the run in Puntland! We took out a senior attack planner and multiple terrorists in a BIG WIN for Somalia and global security. No civilians harmed. America will always lead the fight against terror!”

Trump’s direct engagement with Puntland, rather than Mogadishu, signals a significant shift in U.S. counterterrorism strategy:

• Supporting localized security forces over national governments.
• Targeting key terrorist leaders instead of long-term troop deployments.
• Maintaining a limited but highly effective military footprint in Africa.

By backing Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. may be indicating that it trusts Puntland’s security strategy more than Mogadishu’s centralized approach.

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IV. The Political and Security Consequences

1. Deepening Rift Between Puntland and Mogadishu

The federal government’s unwillingness to assist Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts could lead to:

• Increased Puntland autonomy: Puntland may seek even greater independence in military and governance matters, further straining relations with Mogadishu.
• A divided national security strategy: Somalia’s war against terrorism requires coordinated efforts between regions and the central government. Without unity, extremist groups may exploit these divisions.

2. Regional Security Ramifications

With ISIS suffering heavy losses in Puntland, the group may:

• Attempt to regroup elsewhere in Somalia, potentially shifting its base to southern or central regions.
• Increase terrorist attacks in urban centers to demonstrate its resilience.
• Strengthen alliances with Al-Shabaab, creating a greater security threat for Somalia and neighboring countries.

Puntland will need continued international support to prevent a resurgence of ISIS fighters and maintain pressure on terrorist networks.

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Conclusion: 

A Pivotal Moment for Somalia’s Counterterrorism Efforts

The U.S. airstrikes in Puntland marked a significant turning point in the war against ISIS in Somalia. The strikes:

✅ Eliminated key ISIS leaders and disrupted terrorist operations.

✅ Reinforced Puntland’s counterterrorism campaign.

✅ Highlighted the growing divide between Puntland and the Somali federal government.

However, the lack of support from Mogadishu raises critical concerns about Somalia’s internal security coordination. Without a unified national counterterrorism strategy, terrorist groups may exploit political divisions to their advantage.

For now, Puntland stands at the frontline of Somalia’s battle against terror, with or without Mogadishu’s backing.

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