The Escalating Airspace and E-Visa Dispute in Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland

By Said Noor | November 2025

Tags: Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, ICAO, Airspace Dispute, E-Visa, Horn of Africa, Aviation Safety, Federalism, Geopolitics

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Introduction

The airspace and e-visa dispute among Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland has rapidly intensified, exposing the fragile balance between sovereignty, security, and governance in the Horn of Africa.
What began as a technical disagreement over flight regulation and immigration management has evolved into a high-stakes political standoff with implications for aviation safety, regional stability, and federal cohesion.

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The Emerging Somalia–Somaliland–Puntland Airspace and E-Visa Dispute

In late October and early November 2025, the long-running question of who controls Somali skies re-emerged.

On October 31, 2025, the Somali Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) in Mogadishu issued a directive requiring all airlines operating anywhere within Somali territory—including Hargeisa—to ensure passengers obtain a Somali e-Visa before boarding. The policy was justified as a national security and immigration control measure, asserting the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction.

Two days later, Somaliland’s Ministry of Civil Aviation and Airports Development (MOCAAD) issued a counter-directive mandating Overflight and Landing Permits for any aircraft entering what it considers Somaliland’s airspace. Citing the Chicago Convention (1944), Hargeisa framed this as an exercise of its sovereign right to regulate aviation, effectively rejecting Mogadishu’s claim.

At the same time, the Puntland State of Somalia rejected the e-visa initiative outright. Officials in Garowe declared that the federal government has “no administrative control” over airports in Garowe, Bosaso, and Qardho. They denounced the e-visa policy as an “illegal checkpoint in the sky,” insisting on maintaining visa-on-arrival procedures.

Together, these moves expose a deep fracture within Somalia’s federal structure—one where airspace, borders, and migration have become symbols of competing legitimacy.

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Airspace Control Conflict

Somaliland’s order—effective November 10, 2025—requires all aircraft to seek prior overflight clearance. Though officially described as a safety measure, the rule functions as a political assertion of independence.
Mogadishu, the internationally recognized government, condemned it as illegal and warned that dual control centers could threaten aviation safety.

Pilots flying through the Mogadishu Flight Information Region (FIR) have already reported conflicting radio instructions near Hargeisa, prompting ICAO safety advisories urging compliance only with Mogadishu Control. Such confusion underscores the risk of mid-air incidents in one of Africa’s busiest transit corridors linking the Middle East and East Africa.

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E-Visa System Dispute

The federal government’s electronic visa platform aimed to digitize entry processes and strengthen border management. Instead, it has magnified internal divisions:

• Somaliland rejects the e-visa outright, insisting that visa issuance is a matter of independent sovereignty.

• Puntland calls the system unconstitutional and continues to issue visas on arrival.

• Mogadishu maintains that only the federal system has legal standing under international law.

Airlines now face contradictory orders from rival authorities, leading to delays, denied boardings, and operational uncertainty—an unsustainable situation for both domestic and international carriers.

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Regional and International Implications

The dispute extends beyond Somali politics. Ethiopia’s quiet support for Somaliland and Puntland’s autonomous positions—through investment deals and diplomatic backing—has inflamed tensions with Mogadishu.
Neighboring countries such as Djibouti and Kenya, which rely on shared flight corridors, fear that conflicting control zones could disrupt regional air navigation.

The episode risks transforming Somalia’s airspace into a contested regional arena, with potential spillover effects on trade, tourism, and humanitarian logistics.

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How ICAO and Neighboring States Could Mediate

A sustainable solution requires technical mediation led by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and regional diplomacy by neighboring states.

 ICAO’s Role

• Neutral Technical Framework: Provide a safety-focused platform detached from political recognition.

• Joint Management Model: Revive the Istanbul II Communiqué structure—shared oversight under ICAO supervision.

• Formal Complaint Process: Utilize Article 84 of the Chicago Convention to investigate unauthorized transmissions or unsafe operations.

• Binding Arbitration: Allow ICAO’s Council to issue recommendations; appeals may go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if all sides agree.

 Neighboring States’ Mediation

• Diplomatic Facilitation: Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya can host dialogue platforms and shuttle diplomacy.

• Trilateral Summits: Convene the aviation authorities of the federal government, Somaliland, and Puntland, along with their foreign-affairs ministries, to harmonize protocols.

• Incentive Measures: Align regional air-traffic or visa agreements with ICAO standards to encourage compliance.

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Recommended Steps Forward

1. Reinstate a Joint Airspace Committee with equal representation from Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Garowe.

2. Create a Unified but Decentralized E-Visa System that integrates regional databases while respecting local autonomy.

3. Seek ICAO Arbitration if bilateral talks fail, ensuring adherence to international norms.

4. Engage the UN and African Union as neutral guarantors, pairing diplomatic mediation with technical oversight.

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Conclusion

The current airspace and e-visa crisis reflects Somalia’s unresolved federal tensions—a contest between central authority and regional autonomy projected into the skies.
Without coordinated management, the dispute threatens aviation safety, economic connectivity, and international credibility.

A balanced framework—anchored in ICAO’s technical neutrality and regional cooperation—offers the best route toward restoring confidence, protecting passengers, and safeguarding the sovereignty and stability of the Horn of Africa’s airspace.

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Can the Federal Government Recognize SSC, Khaatumo Without Puntland’s Approval?

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📌 Introduction

The Federal Government of Somalia has ignited new controversy after signaling its intention to recognize Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) — also referred to as Khaatumo — as a federal member state. While this move may seem like a step toward broader inclusion, it has stirred political tensions with Puntland, which constitutionally claims SSC as part of its territory.

In this blog post, I explore the legal, political, and security consequences of this move. 

Can SSC truly become a federal member without Puntland’s approval? Let’s dig in.

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📜 I. What the Constitution Says

Somalia’s Provisional Constitution offers a roadmap for forming federal states:

Article 49(6): "Two or more regions may voluntarily merge to form a Federal Member State."

But here’s the problem — SSC is not composed of two or more independent regions. It is already part of Puntland, a recognized federal member.

That means SSC does not meet the requirement for standalone federal statehood under Article 49(6).

📎 Additional Violations If SSC Is Recognized Unilaterally:

• Article 50(1a): Federal and state governments must consult on governance

• Article 54: Power and resource sharing can only occur via negotiation

And importantly:

Article 142(1): Federal member states that existed before the current Constitution (like Puntland, established 1998) retain their powers until a permanent constitution is finalized.

🛑 In short: Puntland’s territorial integrity cannot be ignored.

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📣 II. Puntland’s Legal and Political Stand

On July 16, 2025, Puntland responded clearly: SSC is part of its constitutional territory.

Puntland’s own constitution (Articles 7 and 138) enshrines Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn as part of its domain. SSC communities have historically been involved in Puntland’s institutions — including Parliament, the Cabinet, and the Judiciary.

Puntland argues:

• No region can be separated from it without a legal process

• The Federal Government is breaching constitutional limits

• The move is politically motivated, aimed at influencing the 2026 elections

🗺️ Article 138 of the Puntland Constitution sets strict conditions:

• Parliamentary approval

• Public consultation

• Clear legal frameworks

None of these have happened.

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🏛️ III. The Lasanod Conference: Illegal Federal Interference?

Puntland accuses the Federal Government of funding and orchestrating the Lasanod conference — which it considers a direct intrusion into its territory.

Yes, Puntland supported the 2023 uprising against Somaliland. But it insists that this doesn’t justify inventing a new state from within Puntland borders.

📉 The risk? Legal breakdown, political fragmentation, and chaos.

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⚠️ IV. Consequences If SSC Is Recognized Unilaterally

🧨 Possible Fallout:

• Erosion of federal trust and unity

• Armed conflict or social unrest

• Somaliland might reassert control over Lasanod

• Radical groups like Al-Shabaab could exploit instability

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🧭 V. What Should SSC Do to Become a Legitimate Federal State?

SSC can’t skip the rules. Here’s what’s required:

1. Build a unified, competent administration

2. Ensure territorial peace and stability

3. Enter structured dialogue with Puntland

4. Collaborate transparently with FGS

5. Support a constitutional review process

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✅ Conclusion

Federalism isn’t just a political slogan — it’s a system grounded in law and mutual respect.

Somalia’s future depends on honoring this structure. SSC’s membership must come from legal dialogue, regional consent, and national unity — not force or political manipulation.

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📝 Final Thoughts

SSC has shown resilience since the Lasanod rebellion. But federal status requires more than military gains or campaign promises.

It needs legal legitimacy and broad consensus.

Puntland’s objections aren’t mere politics — they reflect real fears of constitutional collapse and regional chaos.

📰 Blog Analysis by Said Noor | July 2025

 

Lessons from Puntland: A Strategy for the Federal Government to Defeat Al-Shabaab

Author: Said Noor

Introduction

The continued presence of Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia remains one of the most pressing security concerns for the Somali federal government. Despite ongoing military operations, the militant group retains control over vast territories and frequently carries out attacks against government officials and civilians. The March 18, 2025, attack on President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy near Villa Somalia underscores the persistence of this threat.

In contrast, Puntland successfully eliminated Daesh (ISIS-Somalia) in the Cal Miskaat Mountains within two months in 2025, demonstrating a more effective counterterrorism strategy. This article examines Puntland’s approach and outlines how the Somali federal government can adapt this model to defeat Al-Shabaab through a comprehensive national defense plan.

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Background: The Al-Shabaab Threat and Federal Government’s Approach

Current Counterterrorism Efforts in Southern Somalia

The Somali National Army (SNA), supported by regional forces, clan militias, and international allies, has conducted several offensives against Al-Shabaab. President Mohamud’s administration has emphasized military action, particularly in central and southern regions. However, despite these efforts, Al-Shabaab remains resilient due to:

• Fragmented military strategy – Disconnected regional operations without a unified command.
• Limited coordination with local forces – Unlike Puntland’s effective use of community-led intelligence, federal forces struggle to integrate local militias.
• Tactical adaptability of Al-Shabaab – The group shifts between conventional and guerrilla tactics, allowing it to survive military pressure.

The Attack on President Mohamud: A Case Study in Security Challenges

According to Reuters, Al-Shabaab targeted President Mohamud’s convoy as it traveled towards Mogadishu’s airport. The attack, which killed at least four people, was later claimed by the group on its Telegram channel (Reuters, 2025).

Presidential adviser Zakariye Hussein later confirmed that the president was unharmed and continued to the front lines, reinforcing his commitment to counterterrorism efforts.

Strategic Implications of the Attack

1. Challenge to Government Authority – Directly targeting the president signals Al-Shabaab’s continued defiance.
2. Undermining Public Confidence – Frequent high-profile attacks discourage investment and weaken public trust in security measures (Marchal, 2011).
3. Exposure of Security Gaps – The ability to attack near a fortified location suggests potential intelligence failures or insider involvement.

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Puntland’s Counterterrorism Success Against Daesh in 2025

How Puntland Defeated Daesh in 60 Days

In early 2025, ISIS-affiliated militants attempted to establish a base in the Cal Miskaat Mountains of Puntland. However, within two months, Puntland forces successfully eliminated them using a well-coordinated and intelligence-driven strategy:

• A Unified Military Command – Puntland’s security forces acted under a centralized plan, ensuring operational efficiency.
• Rapid Deployment of Counterterrorism Units – Puntland launched swift and precise military actions instead of prolonged operations.
• Community Engagement and Intelligence Sharing – Puntland authorities encouraged local populations to report militant activity, effectively disrupting Daesh’s networks.

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How the Federal Government Can Apply Puntland’s Strategy

To effectively defeat Al-Shabaab, the federal government must shift from short-term offensives to a structured national defense plan. This requires:

1. Establishing a Unified National Defense Strategy

• Integrate federal, regional, and clan-based forces into a cohesive military structure.
• Develop a centralized command system to ensure effective coordination between units.

2. Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

• Invest in local intelligence networks, following Puntland’s model of community-based reporting.
• Strengthen counterterrorism coordination between national security agencies and international partners.

3. Deploying Permanent Security Forces in Reclaimed Areas

• Instead of temporary military operations, establish permanent security posts in areas freed from Al-Shabaab control.
• Provide local governance and social services to prevent Al-Shabaab from regaining influence.

4. Learning from Puntland’s Rapid Response Model

• Train elite rapid-response counterterrorism units capable of launching highly targeted operations against Al-Shabaab leaders.
• Improve logistical support and mobility to ensure troops can respond quickly to emerging threats.

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Conclusion

The federal government’s current strategy against Al-Shabaab has yielded limited success due to fragmentation, intelligence weaknesses, and lack of a unified national defense plan. Puntland’s successful elimination of Daesh in 2025 demonstrates that a coordinated, intelligence-led, and community-supported approach can effectively dismantle militant networks.

To replicate Puntland’s success, the Somali federal government must adopt a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that prioritizes unified command, intelligence gathering, and permanent security deployments. Only by learning from Puntland’s rapid and decisive operations can Somalia hope to eliminate Al-Shabaab and secure long-term stability.

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References

• Botha, A., & Abdile, M. (2019). Radicalization and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia. Institute for Security Studies.
• Brookings Institution. (2023). Somalia’s Counterterrorism Strategy Under President Mohamud.
• Bryden, M. (2022). Somalia’s Security Sector Reform: Challenges and Prospects. CSIS.
• Crisis Group. (2023). Somalia’s War Against Al-Shabaab: Challenges and Opportunities.
• Hansen, S. J. (2013). Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012. Oxford University Press.
• Hiraal Institute. (2024). Security Risks in Mogadishu: Al-Shabaab’s Evolving Tactics.
• International Crisis Group. (2024). Security Risks in Mogadishu: Al-Shabaab’s Evolving Tactics.
• Marchal, R. (2011). The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in Somalia. African Security Review, 20(2), 47-57.
• Reuters. (2025). Somali Militants Target Presidential Convoy in Bomb Attack, President Safe.
• Wikipedia. (2024). Puntland’s Counterterrorism Success Against ISIS-Somalia in Cal Miskaat Mountains.
• Williams, P. (2021). Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2021. Oxford University Press.

 

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Puntland's Fight Against Terror: How U.S. Airstrikes Shift the Balance

By Said Noor

Introduction: 

A Strategic Shift in Somalia’s Counterterrorism Battle

On February 1, 2025, former U.S. President Donald Trump ordered precision airstrikes targeting ISIS militants in Puntland, Somalia. The operation, focused on Al-Miskat hideouts in the Bari region, was conducted in coordination with Puntland’s government, significantly weakening ISIS’s operational presence. However, a key development in this offensive was the lack of support from Somalia’s federal government, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, for Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts.

This raises serious questions about the political and strategic divisions between Puntland and Mogadishu, the effectiveness of U.S. intervention, and the long-term consequences for counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa.

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I. Puntland’s Lone Battle Against ISIS

1. Puntland's Strategic Fight Against Terrorism

Since December 2024, Puntland has been engaged in a self-led military operation to eliminate ISIS cells entrenched in the mountainous terrain of the Bari region. Unlike the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, which operates primarily in southern Somalia, ISIS in Somalia has established bases in Puntland, taking advantage of the region’s rough terrain and limited federal oversight.

Puntland’s government has declared counterterrorism a top priority, recognizing that allowing ISIS to operate freely would:

• Destabilize local governance and threaten Puntland’s political and economic autonomy.
• Increase terror attacks on local leaders, businesses, and civilians.
• Strengthen jihadist recruitment networks, drawing foreign fighters into Puntland.

Despite these threats, the Somali federal government in Mogadishu has not provided any military, logistical, or financial support to Puntland’s offensive against ISIS. Instead, Puntland has had to rely on international partners such as the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to sustain its operations.

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2. Puntland’s Government Statement on the Airstrikes

On February 2, 2025, the Puntland State Government of Somalia released an official press statement following the U.S. airstrikes, acknowledging their significance in the ongoing war against terrorism. The statement expressed deep appreciation for the U.S. and UAE’s support:

“The Puntland government acknowledges and expresses its sincere gratitude to international partners who have extended their support in the ongoing efforts to combat ISIS terrorists in the region. In particular, we appreciate the contributions of the United States and the United Arab Emirates, whose involvement in airstrikes targeting Daesh elements concealed within the Al-Miskat mountains of the Bari region has been invaluable.”

However, notably absent from the statement was any mention of the Somali federal government, further highlighting the growing divide between Mogadishu and Puntland in counterterrorism policy.

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II. The Somali Federal Government’s Lack of Support

1. Why Has Mogadishu Refused to Support Puntland?

The federal government in Mogadishu, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has taken a centralized approach to counterterrorism, prioritizing operations against Al-Shabaab in the south rather than focusing on ISIS in Puntland. Several factors explain this lack of support:

• Political Rivalry: Puntland has long sought greater autonomy from Mogadishu, often operating independently in security matters. The federal government may view supporting Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts as legitimizing its autonomy.
• Competing Priorities: Mogadishu is preoccupied with Al-Shabaab, which poses a direct threat to the capital and central regions. The government may see ISIS in Puntland as a secondary concern.
• Tensions Over Foreign Military Cooperation: The U.S. airstrikes in Puntland were coordinated without Mogadishu’s direct involvement. This could create friction between the Somali government and the U.S., suggesting that Washington bypasses the central government in favor of regional actors.

Mogadishu’s failure to support Puntland’s military efforts raises concerns about the effectiveness of Somalia’s national counterterrorism strategy. If regional and federal authorities are not aligned, terrorist groups could exploit these divisions to strengthen their positions.

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III. The Role of U.S. Airstrikes: A Calculated Intervention?

1. Trump’s Counterterrorism Strategy in Somalia

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has always favored precision strikes over prolonged military engagements, a doctrine that aligns with his “America First” foreign policy. After ordering the Puntland airstrikes, Trump took to Twitter (X) to declare the mission’s success:

“ISIS is on the run in Puntland! We took out a senior attack planner and multiple terrorists in a BIG WIN for Somalia and global security. No civilians harmed. America will always lead the fight against terror!”

Trump’s direct engagement with Puntland, rather than Mogadishu, signals a significant shift in U.S. counterterrorism strategy:

• Supporting localized security forces over national governments.
• Targeting key terrorist leaders instead of long-term troop deployments.
• Maintaining a limited but highly effective military footprint in Africa.

By backing Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. may be indicating that it trusts Puntland’s security strategy more than Mogadishu’s centralized approach.

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IV. The Political and Security Consequences

1. Deepening Rift Between Puntland and Mogadishu

The federal government’s unwillingness to assist Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts could lead to:

• Increased Puntland autonomy: Puntland may seek even greater independence in military and governance matters, further straining relations with Mogadishu.
• A divided national security strategy: Somalia’s war against terrorism requires coordinated efforts between regions and the central government. Without unity, extremist groups may exploit these divisions.

2. Regional Security Ramifications

With ISIS suffering heavy losses in Puntland, the group may:

• Attempt to regroup elsewhere in Somalia, potentially shifting its base to southern or central regions.
• Increase terrorist attacks in urban centers to demonstrate its resilience.
• Strengthen alliances with Al-Shabaab, creating a greater security threat for Somalia and neighboring countries.

Puntland will need continued international support to prevent a resurgence of ISIS fighters and maintain pressure on terrorist networks.

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Conclusion: 

A Pivotal Moment for Somalia’s Counterterrorism Efforts

The U.S. airstrikes in Puntland marked a significant turning point in the war against ISIS in Somalia. The strikes:

✅ Eliminated key ISIS leaders and disrupted terrorist operations.

✅ Reinforced Puntland’s counterterrorism campaign.

✅ Highlighted the growing divide between Puntland and the Somali federal government.

However, the lack of support from Mogadishu raises critical concerns about Somalia’s internal security coordination. Without a unified national counterterrorism strategy, terrorist groups may exploit political divisions to their advantage.

For now, Puntland stands at the frontline of Somalia’s battle against terror, with or without Mogadishu’s backing.

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